Glass Ej_l£ 

Book --CTtq 



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
War Notes No. III. 
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 



SKETCHES 

FBOM THE 



SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 

BY 

COMMANDER J 



TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN. 




OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 



WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899. 



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
War Notes No. III. 
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 



SKETCHES 



FROM THE 



SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 



BY 



COMMANDER J 



— m 



TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN. 




OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 



WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
18 9 0. 



£7i 



INTRODUCTORY. 



During the recent war the German protected cruiser Geier, Com- 
mander Jacobsen, was stationed in the West Indies, in the vicinity of 
Cuba, and was permitted to pass in and out of the blockaded ports. 
There has lately appeared in the Marine-Rundschau, of Berlin, an 
official publication, a series of "Sketches from the Spanish- American 

War, by Commander J " Their translation complete is 

given in this number of the War Notes. 

Richardson Clover, 
Commander, U. S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer. 

Navv Department, January 16, 1899. 



Approved : 

A. S. Crowninshield, 

Chief of Bureau of Navigation. 



3 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



By Commander J 

[Translated from the Marine-Rundschau, October, November, and December, 1898.] 

The following considerations constitute the opinions of the author 
as acquired by him on the scene of war. He wishes to call special 
attention to the fact that until authentic data are available as to the 
strength of the two opponents in the different battles, the tactical 
situations and intentions, and the losses in personnel and material, 
the reports can be but incomplete. Nevertheless it will be desirable, 
even without awaiting official statements, which may not be published 
for years by the two belligerent parties, to sift the confused mass of 
material which has come to us through the newspapers and to try 
and describe the most important operations, at least approximately, 
as they have taken place. To that end I have partly made use of 
reports of Germans who were eye witnesses of the events. It is 
hardly necessary to emphasize the fact that the author has observed 
the strictest impartiality in his estimates of the situation. He has 
the same high regard for Spanish and Americans. 

I. THE CAUSE OF THE WAR. 

1. Much has been said and written about the cause of the war; 
but, even at the risk of offering nothing new, I believe I ought not 
to avoid entering into this question, in order to make the sketch com- 
plete. 

As early as 1890 Mahan's sharp eye discerned what course the poli- 
tics of his country ought to follow, and in vigorous language he 
pointed out that course to his nation, from a military standpoint, in 
his essay entitled "The United States looking Outward, " and in 1893 
in "The Isthmus and Sea Power. " But not only strategic interests, 
commercial interests also, play a poAverful part in this historical 
drama. Almost nine-tenths of all the sugar from Cuba is already 
going to the American market. If America succeeds in getting 
Cuba into her hands, either by autonomy or by annexation, it will 
insure an immense advantage 1 to the American market ami drive all 
other kinds of sugar (Germany is interested to the extent of many 
million marks) entirely oul of America. Moreover, only a small pari 
of Cuba is as yet being cultivated, and there are good prospects for 
harvesting from tins beautiful count ry immense wealth in sugar and 
tobacco. Upon calm consideration it is therefore not astonishing 



6 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



that the Government of the United States, pressed by the wishes of 
the people and by speculators having only their own interests in 
view, should finally have yielded and resolved to lay aside the 
peaceable attributes of commerce and industry and take the sword 
in hand. It should further be mentioned that the Maine affair 
threw the last spark into the powder barrel, and that the conduct of 
American officials at Havana toward the Spanish officials subse- 
quently added further fuel to the flame. 

The United States of America has done what other nations in 
its place might perhaps have accomplished long ago. According 
to the old adage that a war arises out of the needs of nations, the 
Union has taken advantage of the opportunity to secure for herself 
the first place in the West Indies. 

2. Very different from the United States, the power of the Spanish 
Empire, which at one time ruled the world, has been gradually under- 
mined. The flourishing colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, 
etc., have suffered severely during the last few years from fanatic 
conflicts between the inhabitants and Government troops as a result 
of the injudicious policy followed in the government and treatment of 
the former. Owing to the corruptibility of the officials, fostered by 
the merchants, the actual revenues from the colonies never reached 
the hands of the Spanish Government. The principle of the Spanish 
to compensate themselves first of all out of the rich profits of the 
country has brought about the catastrophe. It was precipitated by 
the fact that repeated changes in the highest positions were approved 
by the Government at Madrid, which necessitated not only a change 
in the majority of the lower officials, but entailed an entirely new 
system of oppression and systematic robbing of the inhabitants. 
When the Government at last realized the true state of affairs it 
was already too late. Blanco, the last Captain- General and governor 
of Cuba, as well as Martinez Campos, are well known as men of 
unimpeachable character. But although General Blanco had an 
intimate knowledge of Cuban conditions and enjoyed great popularity, 
he did not succeed in stopping the rolling ball. Steadily it was 
approaching the abyss, and even the autonomy proclaimed by the 
Government could not save it from the catastrophe. That catastrophe 
was the war with the United States. The Spanish, it is true, consider 
it an entirely unwarranted interference with rights that have been 
theirs for centuries and an act of violence on the part of a neighbor- 
ing nation. But that is a characteristic of the Spanish nature and 
will serve to explain subsequent situations during the war. Even up 
to the very last day Spain thought it utterly impossible that war could 
break out with the United States. This is proved by the conditions 
in Cuba immediately after the sending of the ultimatum by the 
United Stales and the rejection of the same by the Spanish Govern- 
menl . 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



7 



If the Spanish had not been so blinded, and had had eyes for what 
was going on in their immediate vicinity and in the country of their 
powerful neighbors during the last few years, they could not have 
hesitated to set aside their pride, and even to give up their right to 
the colonies. The United States would have paid Spain a handsome 
sum for the Atlantic colonies. The Spanisli army, which had been 
fighting for years with great valor and under endless privations, 
would have honorably returned home, the Spanish merchants would 
have continued their business under safe protection, and the pur- 
chase price would have helped the mother country in her financial 
troubles. That would have been practical. But fate and the obsti- 
nacy, or rather the pride, of the Spanish willed differently. The 
ball keeps on rolling, and nothing will stop it until the Spanish power 
is deprived of its colonies and, utterly broken, without any prospect 
for the future, retires to its exhausted mother country. But that will 
not prevent the people from proudly raising their heads and exclaim- 
ing : ' ' "We have defended our honor and have fought trusting in our 
just cause. Ours is the glory ! " 

3. Thus the struggle for existence is ever the same, even as between 
modern nations. And each country which, by reason of its commerce 
and industry, is entitled to a voice in the politics of the world, should 
learn a serious lesson from this struggle between capital and anti- 
quated heroism. Germany, above all, should never forget that 
nothing but a naval force will keep her safe from adversaries — a 
naval force strong enough to guarantee, or at least not to preclude, 
success under all possible circumstances. 

II. THE BELLIGERENT PARTIES. 

4. I will not go into particulars as to the formation and strength 
of the belligerent parties, as this work is not intended to discuss the 
course of the whole war, but merely to select a few important and 
interesting events. Besides, the reader will have an opportunity of 
gaining information on these points by many other discussions on the 
subject. There has lately appeared in the Marine-Rundschau a 
review on the events of the Spanish- American war, giving the 
strength of both parties, together with a discussion by Rear-Admiral 
Pluddeman, which is especially well adapted for thai purpose. I 
shall take the liberty, however, of inserting a few remarks as to my 
personal observations while on the scene of war. 

-V As the United States of North America does not constitute a 
military nation and has troubled itself very little about the organ- 
ization of militia and volunteers, it would not be proper to make 
the same requirements of American soldiers thai we are in the 
habit of making of our soldiers in Europe. Preparatory training 
need not be looked for, except in the case of regular troops, and even 



8 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, 



there such training* in time of peace is very defective. The com- 
panies of militia and volunteers are drilled for a short time ; officers 
and men become acquainted with each other, and as soon as an officer 
is able to lead his company or division and the men have learned to 
handle their guns, which is at most four weeks, the troops are 
considered ready for war. 

This system naturally precludes the exercising together of large 
bodies consisting of several regiments. First of all, trained officers 
are lacking for that purpose, and besides, it is not deemed necessary. 
These troops do not fight, like European armies, in close ranks, but 
rather on the order of guerrilla warfare. It will be readily under- 
stood that under such circumstances there can be no question of 
great discipline under fire or in camp on the part of the men, nor of 
high tactical conceptions and corresponding leadership on the part of 
the officers. It is very praiseworthy, therefore, that with such primi- 
tive means such great results were attained as evidenced, for instance, 
by the capitulation of Santiago. As for the individual qualities of 
the American soldier, he is brave, too impetuous perhaps, and as 
long as there is fighting to be done and the hardships are not too 
great he is easily guided. A few volunteer regiments fought with 
considerable valor. But not in that respect alone have they shown 
military efficiency, but also in the manner in which they have 
endured fatigues in the extremely unfavorable climate. I am prob- 
ably not mistaken in the assumption that the good results attained by 
some of the volunteer regiments are partly due to the circumstance 
that outdoor sport is carried on with great zeal in the United States. 
Polo, football, athletic exercises in running, walking, and jumping, 
tennis, bicycling, rowing, etc, are excellent preparations for military 
service, because they harden the body and strengthen self-confidence. 
And if the volunteers further know how to handle their guns and are 
good marksmen, which is also included among the sports, they have 
very nearly all the qualities which the Americans require of their 
soldiers. 

(3. The United States Navy has been diligently at work ever since 
the war of the rebellion, 1861 to 1865, and has put to profit the lessons 
derived therefrom. That the American naval officers are intelligent 
and energetic as Avell as brave and self-possessed leaders, and the 
American sailors cool-headed and good marksmen, was demonstrated 
by many examples during the above-mentioned war. The naval bat- 
tle between the Kearsarge and Alabama, such deeds as Farragut's at 
Mobile, will never be forgotten and go to prove that the first founda- 
tion for a warlike and efficient navy — an able personnel inured to the 
sea — was in existence. Nor does the Union need fear a comparison 
with other nations as far as materiel is concerned. Since the year 
L888 it has been the endeavor of the Navy Department to take the 
construction of ships, armor plate, and ordnance into its own hands, 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH -AMERICAN WAR. 



9 



so as to render itself entirely independent of other countries in that 
respect. The increase of the fleet has kept pace with such efforts. 
The battle ships Iowa, Indiana, Oregon, and Texas possess all the 
requirements of modern ships. Their heavy artillery is unuSally 
strong, and the medium and light artillery consists of rapid-fire guns 
in larger numbers. The new armored cruisers New York and Brook- 
lyn are fast and powerful ships, entirely on a level with the same class 
of cruisers in England and France. It can not be denied that a certain 
weakness regarding the personnel lies in the fact that so many different 
nationalities are represented on board ; but I believe this circumstance 
is not of very great weight. Europeans are too much inclined to see 
everything only with their own eyes and judge matters according to 
their own usages. On board of a ship, where very strict laws prevail, 
especially in time of war, it can not be difficult, even among mixed 
nationalities, to maintain the necessary discipline as long as the 
officers have a correct understanding of how to handle the crews, 
and that faculty the American naval officers do possess, as has already 
been stated. Moreover, the reports of the Naval War College at 
Newport show that it is the endeavor of the Navy Department to 
have the officers gain also the necessary knowledge of tactical and 
strategic questions. During the last few years fleet maneuvers have 
taken place, the training of the crews has been carried on in a sys- 
tematic manner, and, finally, target practice has been given the 
importance which is absolutely necessary for the attainment of the 
final end, namely, the annihilation of the enemy in war. I do not 
want to be misunderstood and do not mean to give the impression 
that the American Navy is above all censure and should be taken as 
a model in every respect. Not at all. Many weaknesses have come 
to light everywhere. I will only call to mind the taking off of the 
armor plates of the Iowa, several faulty gun constructions, which 
are withheld for publication. And the boilers were probably not free 
from objections either. But in what navy are such defects not found? 
It is therefore deserving of sincere praise that the Navy, immediately 
after the breaking out of hostilities, was ready for service with all 
the ships in commission and has continued such service successfully 
for several months. Furthermore, the vessels of the merchant marine 
which were required for the blockade were fitted out and armed with 
rapid-fire guns in a very short space of time. This latter circum- 
stance especially might well serve as an example to several other 
navies. 

7. As compared with the United States, Spain has a large regular 
army. l>ut when we remember that so many colonies have to be 
defended and that the struggles with the insurgents, which have been 
going on for years, and the hardships connected therewith, have 
claimed many victims, the importance of this army shrinks consider- 
ably. It should further be remembered thai the troops in Cuba and 



10 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.. 



Puerto Rico are distributed along the coasts for protection and that 
communications between them and concentration of these troops by 
railway are possible only in few places. Hence it can hardly be said 
that the Spanish troops are superior to the American fighting forces 
as far as strength is concerned. As to their military qualities, the 
Spanish soldiers are highly thought of everywhere. They are very 
brave, of great power of endurance, always sober, and extremely frugal. 
The officers present a good military appearance, but their education 
is said to be superficial. Their patriotism and readiness to sacrifice 
themselves can not be questioned. Moreover, officers and men have 
become inured to warfare through their fights with the insurgents and 
are acquainted with the difficult topography of the country. Outside 
of the regular army volunteer regiments have been organized every- 
where. To see those people of all conditions and ages devote them- 
selves indefatigably to the duties of their new calling, after their 
regular day's work is done, can not fail to arouse a feeling of admira- 
tion. But, on the other hand, it is questionable whether the A^olun- 
teers, when it comes to actual fighting, will prove efficient. In the 
first place, their equipments are very defective, and, besides, their 
training is not sufficient to fit them for war. It may be stated as a 
general thing — and this applies to the regular troops as well — that the 
training is not adapted to war purposes. I witnessed, for instance, a 
drill of coast artillery where the movements of loading and firing were 
practiced. Projectiles, cartridges, etc. , were lacking at the drill. The 
guns were not aimed, there was no sighting. That was one day before 
an actual bombardment occurred at that place. It is very evident 
that such gun crews can not do veiy efficient work. In only a few of 
the coast towns did target practice take place, and then only to a 
very limited extent. The reason was, as I was told, that ammunition 
was scarce, as the service ammunition had to be reserved for the 
enemy. That may be true, but this should have been thought of in 
time of peace, and this most important preparation for war should not 
have been deferred to the last minute or omitted altogather. 

8. The Spanish navy has never recovered since the beginning of 
the century, Avhen it was completely annihilated. To illustrate, I will 
quote Nelson's words after a visit to Cadiz in 1793: "The Dons may 
know how to build beautiful ships, but they do not know how to pro- 
cure men. At Cadiz they have in commission four battle ships of the 
first rank, very beautiful ships, but miserably manned. I am quite 
certain if the crews of our six boats, who are picked men, had boarded 
one of these ships, they could have taken it." Mahan, in his work 
on The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1783 to 1812, Chapter 
II, has cited a number of other proofs to show the lack of seamanship 
on the part of the Spanish. The above-mentioned words of Nelson's 
arc stili true. A few handsome ships like the Aim ir ante Oquendo, 
Vizcaya, and Infanta Maria Teresa have been incorporated into the 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



11 



Spanish navy, but next to nothing has been done for the training of 
the personnel. Maneuvers of several fleets together were unknown, 
and the individual training of officers and men was limited to what is 
absolutely necessary. Especially as relates to target practice much 
has been left undone. The same thing applies to the torpedo-boat 
destroyers which the Spanish have secured during the last few years. 
The vessels were very beautiful, but no thought was taken of the 
manner in which they should be handled by their commanders, nor 
the training in tactics and torpedo launching. As to the condition 
of the ships generally, I will state, among other things, that the 
boilers of three cruisers of the same class, the Reina Mercedes, 
Alfonso XII, and Reina Cristina, were in such bad condition as to 
completely disable the vessels, so that they could be utilized only for 
harbor defense. There are several other points which also show care- 
lessness in the training of the personnel as well as equipment of the 
ships, and to which I Avill again refer in the course of this work. 

III. BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN DE PUERTO RICO. 

9. It was on May 9, 1898, that I had an opportunity for the first 
time of visiting the scene of war ; that was at San Juan de Puerto 
Rico. The first thing that caught my eye was a proclamation by 
the Governor-General Macias. As this proclamation shows the 
enthusiasm and patriotism of which the Spaniard is capable to such 
a high degree, I give below a translation of the same : 

San Juan, April 23, 1898. 

Inhabitants of Puerto Rico : 

The day of trial, the hour of great decisions and great deeds of heroism has 
arrived. The Republic of the United States, trusting in her powerful resources and 
relying on the impunity with which she has so far been able to foster the insurrec- 
tion of the Cubans, has resolved in her Congress upon armed intervention in the 
island of Cuba. The Republic has opened hostilities and has trampled under foot 
the rights of Spain and the moral sentiment of the whole civilized world. This is a 
declaration of war, and in the same manner that the hostile squadrons have com- 
menced their actions against the island of Cuba they will also direct them against 
Puerto Rico; but here they will surely be shattered against the loyalty and valor of 
the inhabitants, who would a thousand times rather die than surrender to the 
usurpers. 

Do not think that the mother country has abandoned us. With enthusiasm she is 
following our movements and will come to our rescue. The squadrons are ready tor 
the fight. All the troops have been armed, and the same waters over which Colum- 
bus sailed with his famous ships will witness our victories. Providence will not 
permit that in these countries which were discovered by the Spanish nation the 
echo of our language should ever cease to be heard, nor that our flag should disap 
pear from before the eye. 

Inhabitants of Puerto Rico, the time for heroic deeds has come. Fight and stand 
firm in the consciousness of your right and of justice. On to the war ! 

Long live Puerto Rico, always Spanish! Long live Spain ! 

Macias. 

It seems to me thai more beautiful and more eloquen.1 words could 
hardly he found to speak to the hearts of the people. And unless 



12 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAK. 



the actions and deeds of the leaders fall far short of their words, the 
American invasion may be prepared to meet with strong resistance. 

10. The city of San Juan is located on an island, and presents from 
the sea a very pretty picture with her ancient castle of Morro on one 
side and San Cristobal Castle on the other. The forts are powerful 
masonry structures. Between them rise many stately buildings, 
mostly barracks, hospitals, etc. The Spanish flag is waving from all 
the buildings, and lends a picturesque charm to the whole scene in the 
wonderfully bright light, with chains of mountains as a background. 

Besides the old forts there are a number of new fortifications, east 
of Cristobal Castle as well as in the entrance of the harbor itself. The 
latter, which is difficult to pass even in time of peace, is closed by 
mines. After passing through the harbor entrance one enters a large 
basin close behind the city, adapted to receive a large number of 
ships. There is also a second bay with sufficiently deep water. With 
the necessary funds the harbor might be greatly improved by dredg- 
ing, especially by the removal of at least a part of the shoals at Punta 
Larga. There are quite a number of piers offering good facilities for 
loading and unloading ships. 

11. In consequence of the breaking out of the war with the United 
States commerce was, of course, at a standstill. Yet as the harbor 
had not been declared blockaded there were a few German and Eng- 
lish steamers that Avere unloading their cargoes. A Spanish steamer 
also had been brought in from St. Thomas by the auxiliary cruiser 
Alfonso XIII. The only vessel that behaved in a suspicious manner, 
having apparently passed around the whole island several times and 
repeatedly appeared in front of San Juan, was a large ocean steamer 
with three smokepipes. The general opinion was that it was a United 
States auxiliary cruiser. The Spanish gunboats tried several times to 
go close up to this vessel but did not succeed, owing to her superior 
speed. Nothing else in the city reminded one of war. Every one 
was pursuing his accustomed occupations as far as this was possible 
under the circumstances. Almost every evening afuer the close of 
business at 5 o'clock the volunteer companies marched through the 
streets to the place where they were drilled. There was not much 
done in that line, however, at least nothing of great importance, such 
as target practice, instruction in topography, or field service. Usually 
the troops were required to take their positions in the line of defense, 
and soon after they would march off again. On the whole, the vol- 
unteers made a good appearance and seemed to devote themselves 
with great zeal to their tasks. The large number of young men among 
the volunteers was striking. On one occasion the Governor- General 
made a general inspection of the whole fortification, and at that time 
exercises took place Avith several batteries. But the exercises were 
carried out in a careless manner and without system. Target prac- 
tice with guns, which would have been necessary above all in order 
1o place the fortification in condition for war and to drill the person- 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



13 



nel, was held neither in peace nor after the breaking out of the war. 
In the evening the whole population would usually repair to the 
plaza; several times during the week there was music there. The 
theater also remained open and enjoyed pretty good audiences. 

12. This peaceful situation was suddeuh T changed when, on May 12, 
1898, a part of the fleet commanded by Admiral Sampson appeared at 
5 o'clock in the morning in front of San Juan, and without any further 
notification opened the bombardment. The Spanish complained bit- 
terly of this surprise, which did not give them a chance to remove the 
sick and the women and children to places of safety, and did not give 
foreign representatives and warships time to leave the city or the 
harbor. " There are no international agreements, it is true, as to 
previous notice of a bombardment," says the Puerto Rico Gazette, "but 
in practice the custom prevails among all civilized nations to give 
notice of the bombardment of a city or fortification. For no Christian 
soldier, no civilized nation, will want to take the terrible responsibility 
of butchering defenseless women and children. The soldier fights 
against those who carry weapons, but not against the weak and the 
sick." The Spanish are not entirely wrong in this. A real surprise 
could have been of advantage to Admiral Sampson only in case it had 
been his intention to force the harbor. If it was simply a question of 
reconnoissance, he might have granted a delay of two or three hours 
without in any manner prejudicing the result of the bombardment. 
As it was, the inhabitants were rudely awakened from their sleep. 
The troops and volunteers at once hurried to their posts; but old men, 
women, and children sought their safety in the fields and roads outside 
of the city. A veritable emigration of fleeing people was moving 
along the road to Cangrejos, but all were quiet and orderly. Mean- 
while the American projectiles were steadily falling upon the city and 
its vicinity; some passed over the city and fell into the bay. 

13. The American squadron was composed of nine larger ships and 
two torpedo-boat destroyers. Fire was opened immediately after 5 
o'clock and continued until about 8.30. Four of the American ships 
were about two cable lengths (370 meters) north of the island of 
Cabras (see accompanying chart), and at equal distances from each 
other they were describing circles. In order to safely avoid the shal- 
low places near the island, which they passed at a short distance, a 
boat had been anchored in the center of the circle. They came to 
within 1,500 meters of the Morro, and as each ship passed the cas- 
tle she tired a broadside. Five of the American ships were lighting 
farther north with Cristobal Castle and the eastern batteries of Morro 
Castle. These ships often changed their posit ions. Two more ships 
could be discerned northeast of Santiago. Several of the American 
ships succeeded in passing so close to the fortifications that l he near- 
est batteries could not fire upon them. The distance was probably 
800 or 900 meters. The Spanish infantry took advantage of the 
opportunity to join in the battle with ninskcl fire. This inuskel lire. 



14 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



in connection with the fire of a battery at a greater distance, caused 
the American ships to withdraw. It is said that the Americans fired 
in all from 800 to 1,000 shots from their heavy and medium caliber 
guns. 

14. The Spanish fortification artillery is said to have behaved well; 
but the batteries were unable to answer the lively fire of the American 
ships in the same manner. This was due to the fact, aside from the 
defective service of the guns, that many of them could not reach the 
American ships at all. On the Spanish side about 400 projectiles 
were fired in all. It is stated that the Spanish shots hit in several 
instances ; but they can have done no great damage on board of the 
American ships, which has been confirmed by United States official 
statements. The guns in the fortifications are all of medium caliber, 
and their piercing power is not such that a single hit could be 
expected to cause serious injury to a modern ship. The losses on 
the American side were one dead and seven wounded. The number 
of American projectiles fired is out of proportion to the material 
damage caused by them. A large number of shells are said not to 
have exploded. Of course the fortification works were injured to some 
extent, but not one of the guns was put out of action. A few of the 
buildings visible at a great distance, like the barracks, the jail, the 
Hotel Inglaterra, and a few private residences, suffered from the 
bombardment. A large number of projectiles fell into the harbor. 
Some of them even reached the little town of Catano, on the other side 
of the harbor. The French cruiser Amiral Eigault de Genouilly, 
which was lying in the harbor at the time, as also three small Spanish 
gunboats, received a shot in the rigging and smokepipe. The 
Spanish casualties were 20 dead (among them several civilians) and 
20 wounded. 

15. If we inquire into the advantages which Admiral Sampson 
expected from a bombardment of San Juan, we are probably not mis- 
taken in the assumption that it was merely a question of reconnois- 
sance. The batteries were to be brought out; Admiral Sampson 
wanted to ascertain their strength and efficiency and be guided 
thereby in determining the forces it would require for a serious bom- 
bardment of San Juan and the taking of the city by sea. It does 
not appear to have been the object of the American ships to system- 
atically bombard the city and silence the batteries. Probably the 
forts served as a general target, and the number of shots that went 
beyond speak in favor of the assumption that it was also intended to 
reach the Spanish war ships which were supposed to be in the harbor. 
There will be other opportunities to treat of bombardments by Amer- 
ican ships. I will therefore refrain from further remarks at this time, 
and only state it as my opinion that a reconnoissance of the place — 
and there can be no question of anything else, since the American 
fleet withdrew— could have been made with a much smaller expendi- 
1 are of ammunition. 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



15 



IV. EVENTS AT AND NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 

I will not attempt to give a connected account of all the happen- 
ings at and near Santiago and to set forth the reasons which inev- 
itably led to the surrender of that place, but will confine myself to 
the relation of some circumstances which are not generally known, 
and which have come under my own observation. 

1. There is a great deal of uncertainty as to the reasons why the 
garrisons of Guantanamo, Baracoa, etc., were included in the capitu- 
lation of Santiago. The following note of the Spanish chief of the 
general staff will serve to explain this matter. He says, among 
other things : 

The garrison of Guantanamo, consisting- of 7,000 men, had been on half rations 
since June 15 and since July 1 they had received no rations at all, and had been 
living on green corn and horse meat. The garrisons of Baracoa, Sagua de Tanamo, 
as well as of the smaller places of Palma Soriano, San Luis, Dos Caminos, Moron, 
Cristo, and Songo would have been cut off and unable to retreat, and would there- 
fore have been left to the mercy of the enemy, for the nearest place on which they 
could have fallen back was at least a seven days' march distant. That is the reason 
why these garrisons were included in the capitulation, and that of Guantanamo was 
included on account of the absolute lack of provisions. Hence about 10,000 men 
capitulated without having been at the front at all, simply owing to the peculiar 
circumstances. 

2. In order to give a clear idea of the land fortifications of San- 
tiago, wTrich were considerably exaggerated in the first reports of the 
battles near the city, I annex a sketch of the same. 

There was a line of ordinary trenches about 9 kilometers long 
from Dos Caminos del Cobre to Punta Blanca. I also noticed two 
batteries, but they were in such unfavorable positions that they could 
not take part in the battles of July 1 and 3. There were also wire 
fences and other obstructions in some places, as well as blockhouses, 
etc. The following data will show how few were the guns and of 
how inferior quality the material which the Spanish had at their dis- 
posal for the defense of the city. There were available — 

Six 16-centimeter muzzle-loading guns, two of which became dis- 
abled after the first few shots, two more on July 12. It was known 
beforehand that these gnus would not be able to fire more than a few 
rounds, owing to their defective mounts. 

Five 12-centimeter muzzle-loading guns mounted on old carriages. 
On July 12 four of these were disabled, ami the fifth was good for 
only two or three more rounds, although the charge had been reduced 
by one-half. 

Twelve 8-centimeter muzzle-loaders, six of which were unservice- 
able. 

Two 9-centimeter Krupp guns, one of which was dismounted and 
consequently disabled on July 2. 
Two 7.5-centimeter Krupp gnus. 



16 



►SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



Besides these, the fleet had furnished two 9-centimeter Hontoria 
steel guns with a few rounds, which were not tired, and two 7.5-centi- 
meter Maxim guns, which could not be mounted, because the breech 
mechanism had remained on board of the ships. 

Therefore, aside from the muzzle-loaders, which were of very doubt- 
ful value, the Spanish had only two 7.5-centimeter and two 9-centi- 
meter Krupp guns. Whether the former were given a chance to be 
fired at all is doubtful; probably the two 9-centimeter guns were the 
only ones that took part in the battles of July 1 and 3. It is evident 
that with such defective artillery for the defense on land there was 
no chance in a fight with the American siege artillery, which by July 
10, according to statements of American officers, consisted of 34 guns 
that had been installed. 

3. As to the strength of the Spanish troops in the line of attack, we 
have the following data : 

On July 1 there were in the trenches 500 sailors from the fleet ; 450 
men of four companies of the Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico, Xo. 
1; 850 of the Talavera Battalion. Xo. 4; 440 of the San Fernando 
Battalion, Xo. 11; 350 of three mobilized companies; 350 volunteers. 
In all — Sailors, 500; regulars, 1,740; irregulars, 350; volunteers, 350; 
total, 2,940. 

These were the fighting forces. Besides, there were in the city some 
cavalry of the Civil Guard and some soldiers who had been assigned 
to other duties. Of these troops, two companies, one of the Provin- 
cial Battalion of Puerto Rico and one of the Talavera Battalion, in all 
not over 250 men, were defending the fortified position of San Juan. 
At the Socapa there were 400 men, 450 at the Morro, and 120 at Punta 
Gorda battery. Finally, for the defense of the line from Las Graces 
to Aguadores, about 4 kilometers, there were six companies of the 
Cuba regiment of infantry and two companies of irregulars, in all 
about 550 men. 

4. The battles of July 1 and 3 at El Caney and San Juan are the 
only ones of importance in the campaign against Santiago. The 
above figures show that those two positions had very inadequate 
forces for their defense. It is incomprehensible why the Spanish 
commander in chief, after the American troops had arrived and their 
plan of attack was known, did not at least have the troops from 
Morro Castle and the Socapa, where they were of no use whatever, 
cooperate in the defense of the threatened positions in the main line. 
To hold El Caney and San Juan as against the vastly superior Ameri- 
can forces was an impossibility, although the positions were particu- 
larly well chosen and the* ground very difficult for the assailants. 
With the same daring with which the American troops made the last 
assault on these positions, the Spanish defended them firmly and with 
coolness, firing one volley after another. On the spot they were to 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



17 



defend, officers and men fell in great numbers, with that courage 
which has ever distinguished the Spanish soldiers. When the Ameri- 
cans finally succeeded in the assault, they found the trenches of San 
Juan filled with dead, and they buried the brave Spanish soldiers 
where they had fallen by simply filling up the trenches with earth. 
The total losses of the Spanish during the defense of El Caney and 
the attack on the city were : 

Killed — Brig. Gen. Vara del Rey, 3 staff officers, 12 officers, and 68 
men. Missing — Col. Jose Baquero, 4 officers, and 116 men. Prison- 
ers — 2 officers. Wounded — Lieutenant- General Linares, 6 staff offi- 
cers, 30 officers, and 339 men. 

On July 4 Colonel Escario succeeded in reaching Santiago with 
3,000 men. But these troops were exhausted from the march, and 
the city had no provisions for them. It was therefore no wonder that 
the power of resistance of the garrison was not strengthened by their 
arrival, and that the Spanish, in view of the bombardment which they 
could not answer, had no recourse left but to capitulate honorably. 

5. An unlucky star was hovering over Santiago. No one had 
expected an attack on this city, and the events there are another 
proof that in war it is the unexpected and surprising operations, if 
well planned and somewhat favored by luck, that usually promise 
success. The Spanish troops were surely not wanting in bravery and 
good behavior. The cause of the defeat must therefore be sought 
elsewhere, and in my opinion it can be explained as follows: 

(a) ~No thought had been taken of supplying the large cities with 
provisions. If not sooner, at least immediately after the breaking 
out of the war, the commander in chief ought to have assisted these 
places in the most energetic manner in laying in supplies, and where 
no blockade had been declared it could have been done. 

(b) It was the plan of the Spanish commander to defend the whole 
coast, even the smaller harbors. This necessitated a scattering of the 
troops. If it was not deemed expedient to concentrate all the troops 
at Havana, the one truly fortified place, which maneuver would 
have completely changed the character of the war in Cuba, a concen- 
tration of the troops should have been effected at least within the 
eastern province as well as the western province. Why was it that 
Guantanamo was garrisoned by about 7,000 men, Santiago de Cuba 
by 5,000, and Manzanillo by 5,000, and that at a time when Cervera's 
fleet had already entered Santiago Harbor? On May 28 at the latest, 
when the fleet had been closed in and there could no longer be any 
doubt as to the American plans, the troops should have been concen- 
trated at Santiago, bringing with them all available provisions. The 
Americans might have taken Guantanamo and Manzanillo. That 
would have been of little importance from a technical point of view. 
The American troops would have met with energetic resistance upon 

12483 2 



18 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



landing and in their attack upon Santiago, and it is questionable 
whether they would have been able to break such resistance with 
17,000 men. 

(c) The Spanish troops had no field artilleiy, and their siege artillery 
was utterly unserviceable. It is due to this lack of artillery that the 
Americans were enabled to line up their forces without opposition 
from the Spanish ; that they showed themselves superior to the Spanish, 
not in number only, in the fights against the fortified positions at El 
Caney and San Juan ; and finally, that they were able to place their 
siege artillery in position without being harassed by the Spanish. 

6. It now remains to speak of the manner in which the navy and 
army of both belligerent parties cooperated in joint operations, and 
finally, to examine minutely into the bombardments of the batteries 
of Morro Castle, the Socapa, and Punta Gorda. The destruction of 
Cervera's fleet will be treated in a separate chapter. Of course, in 
expeditions of this nature it is always the navy that furnishes the 
basis. If the control of the sea has been gained, but can not be pre- 
served, the transport and landing of troops are dangerous enterprises, 
which a wise commander will always avoid. Success is also dependent 
on a strong and well-equipped transport and war fleet. This should 
be borne in mind by all nations that are engaged in colonial politics 
and are in possession of colonies, in order to secure new markets for 
the surplus production of men and merchandise. Of course the army, 
as the organ which is to execute the work, should be equal to the 
requirements made of it in a foreign country. But there is still another 
factor which plays an important part in such expeditions, and which 
should not be underestimated, and that is the cooperation of the navy 
and army. This factor has been lacking, not only on the American 
but also on the Spanish side. On the American side there was at 
least some agreement on important tactical questions and the navy 
placed itself willingly at the service of the army. But on the. Spanish 
side the conditions were so peculiar that a cooperation of navy and 
army can hardly be spoken of, except in so far as marine troops took, 
part in the battles at Santiago. Was Admiral Cervera under orders of 
General Linares or General Toral, or under Captain-General Blanco, 
or directly under the ministry of marine at Madrid? The first does 
not appear to have been the case, but it seems that Admiral Cervera 
received orders both from General Blanco and from the ministry of 
marine. Another example : The general de marina at San Juan de 
Puerto Rico was in command of the flotilla at that place; he was not 
under orders of Governor-General Macias, however, but under those 
of Admiral Mantarola, at Havana. I believe this question, which 
has hitherto been given little attention, had an essential share in seal- 
ing Admiral Cervera's fate. The cooperation of the nav}^ and army 
is of the greatest importance, and at the great maneuvers in time of 
peace it should receive the same attention that other problems do. 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



19 



7. The American fleet lias in every respect performed its tasks in 
front of Santiago. The transport fleet was convoyed to the places 
chosen by war ships, and the landings were effected nnder the same 
protection. A systematic blockade had been established, and in this 
connection the main object, namely, the destruction of Cervera's fleet, 
was never lost sight of. Thanks to the intelligent dispositions of the 
commander in chief of the fleet and the skill of the American officers 
and crews, this object was attained with complete success. Inci- 
dentally the batteries of the Morro, Socapa, and Punta Gorda were 
bombarded by the American fleet, and these bombardments offer so 
much that is of interest and so many points of discussion for naval 
officers that I shall have to speak of them somewhat more at length. 
How much has been said of these bombardments ! How many times 
have the batteries of the Morro and Socapa been placed out of action, 
the guns dismounted, the fortifications leveled to the ground ! Bat- 
teries which did not even exist, as, for instance, Morro Castle proper 
and Estrella Battery, were said to have returned the galling fire, the 
latter completely destroyed, the former nothing but a heap of ruins ! 
Such were the newspaper 'reports, of the inaccuracy of which I had an 
opportunity of convincing myself personally on the scene of events. 
Unfortunately, I am not in a position to state which of the American 
ships did the firing, nor how many projectiles were discharged in the 
different bombardments, nor the kind of projectiles and the results 
as to hits. But on the other hand I can give from personal observa- 
tion accurate statements as to the condition of the Spanish batteries 
after the surrender of Santiago, and as my own observations have 
been supplemented by reliable information from others who were also 
on the scene, I am enabled to furnish sufficient material to permit an 
estimate of the actual conditions. 

8, On the different days when the bombardments took place the 
following guns were available in the different batteries of the Morro, 
Socapa, and Punta Gorda : 



Bombardment. 



Date. 



No.l. 



No. 2. 



No. 3. 
No. 4. 



May 18 



May 31 



June 3 
June 6 



No. 5 [ June 14 

No. 6 j June 16 

No. 7 ; June 18 

No. 8 1 July 2 



Morro. 



One 16 cm. muzzle- 
loader mounted on 
a wooden carriage; 
could fire only 3 
shots. 

Same and four 16 cm. 
m u z z 1 e-1 o a d e r s 
mounted on c a r- 
riages. 

do 

do 



.do 



Socapa. 



Punta Gorda. 



Two 8 cm. muzzle- 
loaders. 



One 16 cm. Hontoria 
naval gun not yet 
ready 1'or service. 

One 16cm. Hontoria. . . 
Same and one 16 cm. 
Hontoria naval gun. 

do 

do 



Same and two 21 cm. 
muzzle-loading how- 
itzers. 

Same and two 21 cm. Same and one L'l cm. 
muzzle-loading how- > muzzle-loading how- 
itzers, itzer. 



Two 15 em. Hontoria 
howitzers, muzzle- 
loaders. 



Do. 



Do. 

Same and one 16 cm. 
Hontoria naval gun. 
Do. 

Same and one 16 cm. 
Hontoria naval gun. 
Do. 



Do. 



20 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



Hence, on July 2 there were in all — 

In the Morro battery: Five rifled 16-centimeter niuzzle-loading 
bronze guns, only one of which was dismounted, and two 21-centi- 
meter muzzle-loading howitzers which were fired on that day only. 

At the Socapa batteiy: Two 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns 
from the Reina Mercedes. Only one of these was dismounted. Fur- 
ther, three 21-centimeter muzzle-loading howitzers. East of this bat- 
tery, on the extreme edge of the shore, there were for the defense of 
the first row of mines, one 5. 7-centimeter ISTordenfelclt rapid-firing gun, 
four 3. 7-centimeter Hotchkiss revolving guns, and one 1.1-centimeter 
ISFordenfeldt machine gun, all taken from the Reina Mercedes. 

At Punta Gorda: Two 9-centimeter bronze Krupp guns, two 15- 
centimeter howitzers, and two 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns 
from the Reina Mercedes. 

9. About three weeks after the surrender of Santiago, I visited 
these batteries and made the following observations : 

MORRO. 

(a) Morro Castle proper, an old fort, consisting of heavy masonry 
standing close to the water's edge east of the harbor entrance, was 
not armed at all. It was used as barracks for the Spanish garrison. 
The outside walls had suffered considerably from the bombardments, 
the upper story had been completely destroyed, and in different 
places pieces had been shot away. The inner Avails showed large and 
small shot-holes made by shells of different calibers, the largest of 30 
centimeters. 

(b) From the houses between the castle and the light-house, about 
200 meters distant, nothing had been removed. Some of them had 
been completely destroyed, others more or less damaged. The houses 
situated a little farther back and lower down had suffered no inju- 
ries. The light-house, built of iron plates about 2.5 centimeters 
thick, had been pierced at the front by several small-caliber shells, 
the largest being of 15 centimeters. The rear wall had been blown 
out entirely. 

(c) About 100 meters east of the light-house is the new battery, sit- 
uated about 63 meters above the level of the sea. The following is a 
ground plan of this battery : 




The guns are standing on concrete foundations built into the ground 
and fire over a wall erected for protection in front of them, consisting 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



21 



of wooden boxes filled with cement. This protection is further 
strengthened by sandbags placed in front of it. Between each two 
guns wooden barrels filled with cement have been placed on top of 
the wall. The spaces between them are partly filled with cement or 
sand. The cross section between two foundations is about as follows: 




a, Cement boxes; 6, barrels filled with cement; c, sandbags. 



The distance between each two guns is about 6 meters. 

(d) Parallel with the front of the battery, at a distance of about 
10 meters, a trench 1.5 meters deep and 60 centimeters wide has been 
dug. A smaller trench leads in zigzag line from each gun to this 
trench. For the two 21-centimeter howitzers, which were located 
farthest east and separated by a larger space from the 16-centimeter 
muzzle-loaders, there was a hole about 1.5 meters deep and 4 meters 
square, intended as a shelter. These shelters are said to have been 
frequently used by the Spanish. 

(e) The five 16-centimeter muzzle-loaders are bronze guns dating 
from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One of these bore 
the dates 1668, 1718, 1769. About the middle of the present century 
these guns were adapted for centering by means of studs. The two 
21-centimeter howitzers farthest east were rifled iron muzzle-loaders. 

(/) All of these seven guns were mounted on iron sliding carriages 
with front pivots, turning on rails built into the concrete. As recoil 
checks, small iron plates were used which, at the rear of the top car- 
riage, were pressed firmly against the compressor bars by means of 
an ordinary pivot screw. For indirect elevation of the guns there 
was an ordinary graduated disk with a hand. There was no sight 
scale on the graduated arc of the carriage. All the guns were 
adapted to be trained directly. When the Americans took possession 
of the battery they did not find any tangent scales, but the American 
chief of the battery stated that they had been there. 

(g) Near some of the guns cartridges were lying about. A few 
feet west of the right-wing gun and a little to the rear was an 
uncovered pile of projectiles for the 16-centimeter guns. They were 
iron projectiles, with centering studs. The point, which was spheri- 
cal in shape, contained a perforation for the fuse which had been 
stopped up with cotton waste. The fuses themselves could not be 
found. Near this pile of projectiles stood several cartridge boxes. 
Judging from the cartridge-bag material Lying about and the powder 
scattered around it may be assumed that the cartridges were being 
made right there, 



22 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



(h) In the battery itself only minor injuries could be noted. The 
right-wing gun had been upset by a shell, but none of the other guns 
nor the cement protection had received any injuries. A few pro- 
jectiles had struck into the ground in front of the sand bags and 
destroyed a few of them. Back of the battery was lying an Ameri- 
can 20-centimeter shell, which had not been exploded. The base 
fuse had been removed. 

SOCAPA. 

(i) The new battery erected here is located, like that at the Morro, 
on the highest point of the ridge, about 400 meters west of the 
entrance. 

(k) The five guns installed here are in a straight line — the three 
21-centimeter howitzers in the left wing and the two 16-centimeter 
Hontoria naval guns in the right wing. The composition of the 
battery is about the same as that at the Morro, except that there are 
no barrels on top of the cement boxes at the 16-centimeter guns, 
probabty so as not to restrict the angle of fire of these guns and 
because they are protected by a 3-centimeter shield. Immediately 
back of the guns is a trench of little depth connecting the gun 
positions with each other. The 16-centimeter guns are separated 
from the howitzers by a broad traverse. 

(?) The 21-centimeter howitzers are like those at the Morro. The 
two 16-centimeter Hontoria guns were taken from the Reina Mer- 
cedes. They are long guns of modern construction on central pivot 
mounts, but not rapid-fire guns. The pivot sockets are built into 
the concrete foundation. These guns could probably not be fired 
oftener than once in two minutes. 

(m) About 20 meters back of the guns was a frame house with 
sheet-iron roof, built partly into the ground, and protected toward the 
sea by a small embankment of earth. This was an ammunition 
magazine for the battery. It still contained a number of 16-centi- 
meter projectiles with the necessary cartridges and powder boxes. 
The place was little suitable for an ammunition magazine, and it is a 
wonder that it was not hit. 

(n) Evidently the Americans fired more sharply at this battery 
than at the Morro battery, probably because it contained the only 
modern guns whose effects were to be feared. 

One of the howitzers had received a hit of small caliber in the left 
side of the top carriage, but without placing the gun out of action. 
The shield of one of the 16-centimeter guns had been pierced from 
below by a 15-centimeter projectile, and the carriage had also been 
injured, so that the gun became unserviceable. No other damages 
are noticeable in the guns, but at different places shots had passed 
immediately in front of the guns and hit the gun protections and 
sandbags. 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH- AMERICAN WAR. 



23 



PUNTA GORDA BATTERY. 

(o) This battery was not fired upon by the Americans, although it 
took part in the firing on several occasions. 

10. According to the above, the final result of the numerous bom- 
bardments was but one gun placed out of action in the Morro and one 
in the Socapa battery. The loss in human life was a few killed and 
wounded. Punta Gorda battery, the only important position in a 
question of forcing the harbor entrance, remained uninjured. As I 
have already said, I am unable to state the total number of project- 
iles which the American ships fired in order to attain this modest 
result. In any event, the number is out of proportion to the result, 
and has proved once more a fact well established by the history of 
naval wars, namely, that coast fortifications are extremely difficult to 
place out of action, even with an expenditure of large quantities of 
ammunition. The American method of firing may perhaps be suscep- 
tible of improvement — that is not for me to say. But the American 
naval officers may take comfort in the thought that other seafaring 
nations would not have done any better in their place — perhaps not 
so well ; for no navy, with the exception of the French, has made it a 
point in time of peace to make the bombardment of coast fortifica- 
tions, fortified cities, etc., the subject of thorough, practical study. 

11. As for the fire of the Spanish batteries, I have read of but one 
case where a Spanish projectile hit an American ship. It was in a 
fight with the Socapa battery that the battleship Texas received a hit, 
probably from one of the 16-centimeter guns taken from the Be in a 
Mercedes. The projectile struck the port side about 20 feet abaft the 
bow and exploded, after passing through a stanchion between decks 
killing one man and wounding six. The American officer who took 
charge of the battery at Morro Castle also told me the following amus- 
ing incident : There was a bombardment of the Morro battery at night, 
and one of the American ships was throwing her search light on the 
battery. The Spanish answered the fire part of the time. The ship 
with the search light was not hit, but the battleship Iowa, lying quite 
a distance away in the dark, was unexpectedly struck by an acci- 
dental hit from one of the Spanish howitzers. The projectile passed 
through the deck, entered the officers' mess-room, exploded there, and 
caused some minor damages to the rooms; but none of the crew were 
hit. But what more could be expected of the kind of guns the Span- 
ish had at their disposal ? It must surely have given tin 1 American 
officers who took charge of the battery a slight shock when they saw 
the dates 1668, 1718, etc., on the guns which they had been fight- 
ing. Part of the mediaeval howitzers still had charges in them when 
the American officer took possession of the Morro battery. He there- 
fore decided to fire them, which gave him an opportunity of estab- 
lishing the fact that even with the greatest elevation the range was 



24 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



only 800 yards ! It is possible that the cartridges had suffered from 
humidity; but, on the other hand, it is quite as probable that this 
was really their greatest range. One thousand meters was not a bad 
performance for guns of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
No wonder that the Spanish could not reach the hostile ships with 
these guns ! This will also explain why the Spanish garrisons, seeing 
the uselessness of their efforts, often stopped firing during the bom- 
bardments and withdrew to the trenches. It was on these occasions 
that the newspaper reports stated that the batteries had been silenced, 
when, as a matter of fact, they were uninjured and in condition to 
resume their " unbloody work" at any time. 

12. But now another question. Did the American fleet really allow 
itself to be deceived by these batteries ? In the beginning, perhaps. 
And why not ? I do not hesitate to acknowledge that I had the same 
experience, together with several other officers. TThen we inquired 
into the nature of the batteries, we had no idea of the venerable age 
of those guns, but set them down as 12 and 16 centimeter guns. It is 
true that we did not go through a fight with the batteries, and that 
is the essential factor for estimating their efficiency. From observa- 
tions made at the Spanish batteries I judge, as already stated, that 
the Socapa battery was the main objective of the Americans. They 
seem to have known that the only serviceable guns, namely, the 16- 
centimeter Hontoria guns from the Reina Mercedes, had been set up 
there ; but Morro battery, too, was fired upon quite a number of times. 
Would the Americans have done this if they had known what miser- 
able guns their enemies had ? Hardly. So there can be no doubt that 
in the beginning at least the Americans were deceived as to the 
strength of the foe, whom they overestimated, as is usually the case 
in war. Moreover, there was no occasion for the American com- 
mander of the fleet, even if the Spanish batteries had been recognized 
as efficient and dangerous, to attack them under prevailing circum- 
stances. If the harbor entrance was to be forced, neither the Morro 
nor the Socapa battery need have been considered, because they could 
not sweep the narrow entrance with their guns. The Punt a Gorda 
battery was the only one that controlled the entrance, and owing to 
the great distance and the difficulty of observing the fire, it was almost 
impossible to place this batteiy out of action from the sea. Then, why 
the bombardments of the batteries and the immense expenditure of 
ammunition, especially since the American commander in chief did 
not intend to force the entrance, but on the contrary was desirous of 
obstructing it, as is plainly shoAvn by Hobson's attempt ? A simple 
blockade, without any further attack on the fortifications, would 
have had exactly the same result. I can not possibly believe that 
1 he American commander in chief had nothing more in view than to 
harass the enemy by the numerous bombardments and reassure the 
home press. My idea is that Admiral Sampson, as a practical and 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



25 



experienced gunner, had a very definite object in view in these bom- 
bardments. I have no proofs to offer in support of this assumption, 
but I have an idea that there is something in it. After the batteries 
had been brought out all the subsequent bombardments were nothing* 
more or less than target practice. The admiral wanted to accustom 
his officers and men to sharp firing. The whole crews were made to 
practice at regular intervals — the commanders in the manner of 
handling their ships, the officers in conducting and superintending 
the firing, the gun captains in training and aiming, the gun and ammu- 
nition crews in serving the guns and passing the ammunition, and all 
these under conditions of actual war, in fights with coast batteries. 
When the decisive day arrived — the battle on the high sea, ship 
against ship — the American fleet was well prepared and able to 
achieve its task in a brilliant manner and in the shortest possible 
time. 

13. Whether I am right or wrong in this assumption, whether it 
was a question of actual bombardments or of target practice, the 
final result remains the same. Even at target practice each one fires 
as well as he can. Therefore we are still confronted with the fact 
that the coast fortifications, in spite of vastly superior naval artillery 
and the expenditure of immense quantities of ammunition, were not 
placed out of action. What lessons are we to derive from this ? 

Aside from the forcing of harbor entrances, where the assailant 
must eventually expose himself for a short time to the hostile fire, 
cases may arise in war where it becomes necessary prior to such forc- 
ing, or for other reasons, to destroy certain forts. The history of war 
teaches us that this is one of the most difficult problems. It should 
therefore be made a subject of study in time of peace, the same 
as any other problem. Of the necessity of studying tactics and 
strategy and their practical application, everyone is convinced, from 
the commander in chief to the youngest lieutenant. Immense sums 
are being expended for coal alone in order to have the ships of the 
fleet pass through all manner of evolutions in tactics and strategic 
maneuvers. Money should also be devoted to target practice under 
exactly the same conditions as in actual war. For what is it that 
decides a naval battle ? The tactics of the commander in chief of the 
fleet and the commanders of the different ships are certainly of some 
influence on the battle, but nothing more. The decision will always 
be dependent on the good training of officers and men for the fight 
and the good firing of gun captains and officers. That is what the 
naval battle of Santiago has once more plainly demonstrated. 

V. THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA AND CIENFUEGOS. 

1. Immediately after the rejection of the Union's ultimatum by 
Spain, and the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the two 
nations, Havana was blockaded, and later Cienfuegos. 



26 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



On our way to Havana, about the middle of May, we met in the 
Yucatan Channel the first American Avar ships. They were a cruiser 
of the Raleigh class and a torpedo cruiser. The former, painted dark 
gray and stripped for service, having only a signal yard at the fore- 
topmast, being in all other respects cleared for action, made a good 
appearance. A large number of the crew were standing on the upper 
deck and near the guns, curiously eying the foreigner who had entered 
the line of blockade. After the exchange of a few signals as to name, 
place of departure, and destination, we resumed our course for 
Havana. The next morning (May 17), through the veil of mist cov- 
ering the shore, we had a first glimpse of the mountain at Mariel, which, 
by its peculiar shape, affords the sailor an excellent point of bearing. 
A heavy fog was still enveloping Havana, and was not dispersed 
until the sun rose higher in the cloudless blue sky. The first object 
that met our eyes was the old castle of the Morro, with the red and 
yellow Spanish flag waving proudly in the wind. We could dis- 
tinguish the highlight-house to the left of the entrance, and adjoining 
it a huge mass of stone walls and fortifications. Havana from the 
sea forms >a singularly beautiful picture ; but this was a time of war, 
and our eyes, after gazing admiringly on the magnificent panorama, 
turned, as though instinctively guided by the military spirit, to the 
long rows of fortifications visible close to the shore at the Yedado, 
indistinctly at first, then more and more sharply. There was much 
to be seen. During the short moments while we were passing by, we 
had to observe carefully in order to gain at least an approximate idea 
of the value and strength of the forts. The whole line of fortifica- 
tions at the Yedado appeared to have been recently constructed. At 
Santa Clara and La Reina workmen could be seen strengthening and 
changing the original batteries. To the left of the harbor entrance, 
also, we could see two or three newly erected batteries extending as 
far as Cochima (Cojimar?). 

The American blockading vessels remained at a considerable dis- 
tance and were apparently composed of only a few gunboats of the 
Annapolis class and auxiliary cruisers (small steamers or yachts armed 
with a few rapid-fire guns). AYe were slowly approaching the harbor 
entrance, and with the assistance of a pilot entered the harbor, 
passing through the mine obstruction and the channel, which was 
literally lined with guns, though mostly of old designs. Great num- 
bers of people, mostly soldiers and workmen, were crowding both 
sides of the entrance. Silently they were staring at our ship, and 
the same dismal silence also prevailed in the harbor itself. The 
beautiful wharves for loading and unloading steamers were empty. 
Only a number of woiKinen out of employment were sitting or lying 
around . A few boats were moving about in the harbor. All the others, 
as well as the larger sailing vessels which in time of peace are engaged 
in coasting trade, were at anchor in the inner harbor. The coal 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH- AMEBIC AN WAR. 



27 



depots at the other side of the harbor contained immense supplies, 
but at the quays and coaling piers, which are the busiest places in 
normal times, there was not a single vessel to be seen. Finally, 
when we entered the harbor proper, we saw a few Spanish warships — 
the cruiser Alfonso XII, torpedo gunboats Marques de la Ensenada. 
Nueva Espana, Conde de Venadito, and a number of smaller gun- 
boats. These ships, also painted gray, stripped for service and 
cleared for action, made at a first glance a very good appearance, 
especially the large cruiser: but a second glance through glasses 
sufficed to convince us that the large cruiser, Alfonso XII, had no 
large guns on board, which caused us to infer that on the inside also 
everything was not as it should be (and, indeed, it appeared subse- 
quently that the boilers were unserviceable). Close to the Alfonso 
XII the wreck of the Maine could be seen above the water, furnishing 
the key, so to speak, to the strange changes which Havana had under- 
gone in such a short time, the warlike preparations of the garrison 
on the forts outside, the stillness of the harbor, the inactivity of the 
population, and the appearance of the Spanish warships cleared for 
action. 

2. A walk through the streets of the city revealed the usual every- 
day life. Of course the traffic was not as great as in time of peace. 
The wealthier families — Cubans and Spaniards as well as foreign- 
ers—had left Havana in large numbers. Many beautiful houses, the 
former residences of these families, were now standing empty. Beg- 
gars were lying about in front of the church doors and in the main 
streets, among them women with half-starved little children, but not 
in very large numbers. Many a coin Avas dropped into their out- 
stretched hands by the passers-by; but there was nothing to indicate 
at that time that the blockade had entailed serious results for the 
poorer population. Many stores in the principal streets were open, 
but in the majority of cases the clerks were taking it easy, either in 
the store or in front of it. The restaurants and cafes, on the con- 
trary, were enjoying good patronage. The prices, of course, were 
higher than usual, but not extravagant: and for good pay, good din- 
ners could be had in these restaurants. Meat was, on an average. 
1.50 marks (37 cents) a pound. Eggs were particularly expensive. 
The general opinion was that there were sufficient provisions in the 
city to sustain the blockade for some length of time: but what was to 
become of the poorer class of the population in that event was a 
problem. At the restaurants the large number of uniforms was strik- 
ing. They were worn by the volunteers, who were represented at the 
capital in particularly large numbers. A special guard of honor of 
volunteers had been ordered for Captain-General Blanco, and they 
had taken charge of the guard service at the palace. As for the mil- 
itary qualities of these half soldiers, they were probably not of a high 
character, for proper training and drilling were lacking here as well as 



28 SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 

in Puerto Rico. From the city I went to the seashore and took a look 
at the fortifications, especially Santa Clara and La Reina, and I 
could not help admiring the energy and zeal of the Spanish. Every- 
where the greatest activity prevailed. From early until late work 
was going on at the fortifications. The old forts were being strength- 
ened by earthworks and heavy guns mounted at Santa Clara. In 
some of the forts volunteers could be seen practicing at the guns until 
late at night ; other divisions of volunteers had gathered for instruc- 
tion ; feverish activity everywhere, from the private to the officer and 
Captain- General. The latter frequently visited the forts and inspected 
personally the progress of the work. But in view of all this energy 
one may well ask, Was there not too much to be made up that had 
been neglected in time of peace ? It is not possible to make soldiers, 
especially accurate and cool-headed marksmen, in a few weeks or 
months. That can only be done by constant practical training under 
able officers in time of peace. 

3. On May 14 the Spanish gunboats Concle de Venadito and Nueva 
Espana had made an attack on the American blockading vessels, and 
as this is the only instance of initiative on the part of the Spanish 
ships at Havana, I will give an account of it. The Conde de Venadito 
is one of the older cruisers, of 1,200 tons displacement, launched in 
1888, having a speed of 12 knots, armed with four 12-centimeter guns 
and a few light rapid-fire guns . The Nueva Espan a is a torpedo gunboat 
of 600 tons, armed with two 12-centimeter guns and a few light rapid- 
fire guns, reputed to have a speed of 18 knots, but in reality she 
would probably not make more than 14 knots. The 12-centimeter 
Hontoria guns were installed behind shields. According to the state- 
ment of a Spanish officer, these could be fired not oftener than once in 
five minutes. No target practice had taken place. The Nueva 
Espana had fired the first shot at an American war ship. ' Her torpedo 
armament consists of four Schwartzkopff torpedoes of the older type, 
with small explosive charge (about 25 kilograms), and two torpedo 
tubes. ~No regular exercises in torpedo launching had taken place. 
Both vessels have a great deal of woodwork. On the forward conning 
bridge is a saloon with heavy wood wainscoting, tables, chairs, etc., 
none of which had been removed for the fight. Both ships went out 
to sea at 5 o'clock p. m., followed at some distance by two small tugs. 
The blockading line was quite a distance from the shore, and it was 
about an hour before the engagement commenced. Five American 
vessels, probably only gunboats and auxiliary cruisers, were soon 
surrounding the Spanish ships, so that the latter could use their guns on 
both sides. The vessels approached to within 8 kilometers. A suc- 
cessful hit from the Spanish is said to have caused the American 
ships to retreat, but owing to the darkness the Spanish ships did not 
dare follow them, and returned to Havana at 8.30 p. m. without hav- 
ing been hit once. This was not very much of a success, and does 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



29 



not appear to have raised the spirit of the Spanish ; for, even after the 
harbor flotilla had been reenforced by the cruiser Infanta Isabel, it 
never again attempted an attack on the American ships, either at 
night or in daytime. That does not speak very highly for the initia- 
tive and spirit of enterprise on the part of the Spanish naval officers, 
especially as the blockading fleet consisted only of gunboats and 
inferior auxiliary cruisers, which later were reenforced by the large 
cruiser San Francisco. Even the latter might have been successfully 
attacked at night by the Spanish torpedo boats under able command 
and with intelligent handling of the torpedo weapon. 

4. In order to cut off the supply of provisions from the sea the 
cities of Matanzas, Cardenas, and Cienfuegos, which are connected 
with the capital by railway, had been blockaded since the beginning 
of the war. Several attempts of the United States to land troops at 
these places were unsuccessful, owing to the inadequate means with 
which they were undertaken. The Americans therefore confined 
themselves to a few insignificant bombardments, and finally to the 
blockade alone. When I arrived at Cienfuegos, on June 11, 1 did not 
meet a single American vessel keeping up the blockade, either in 
Yucatan Channel or in front of Cienfuegos. I have subsequently 
been told that the American ships would often leave the harbor with- 
out any guard and then suddenly reappear at the end of a few days. 
I infer from this that the Americans did not handle the blockade 
service very strictly at Cienfuegos. The result was that several 
steamers were successful in running the blockade. If the Spanish 
Government had used some energy in securing blockade runners at 
the beginning of the war, or had encouraged them by premiums, 
Havana, as well as the other provinces of the island, could have been 
abundantly supplied with provisions. How little such enterprises 
were supported by the Spanish Government is shown by the fact that 
at Cienfuegos, for instance, two large steamers were lying idle during 
the whole period of the war, while with a little more energy they 
might have been of the greatest service. Besides Cienfuegos, the 
waters near the Isle of Pines — the town of Batabano among 
others — were very favorably situated for blockade runners. From 
suitable anchoring places in deep water, which are abundant in that 
vicinity, the cargoes could have been taken ashore by smaller vessels. 
Of course, all such matters require preparation and decisive action- 
conditions which did not exist among the Spanish. As a matter of 
fact, at different times in the course of the war supplies did reach 
Cuba just in that manner, and that was the reason why the United 
States saw themselves compelled to extend the blockade from Cape 
Antonio to Cape Cruz, the whole territory here under discussion. 

5. When we arrived at the entrance to Cienfuegos we noticed to the 
right the ruins of a light-house, which the Americans had tired upon 
in an unsuccessful attempt at landing. To the left of the harbor 



30 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



entrance, which was now plainly visible, was a large cascle in the 
usual Spanish style of architecture, standing on an elevation, and 
below it the town, which, with its white houses hidden among trees, 
reached down to the water's edge. The houses were mostly one-story 
high, with porches running all around. Some boats and small steam- 
ers were lying at the landing piers. After hoisting the necessary sig- 
nals and waiting patiently we saw two Spanish gunboats approaching. 
We could plainly see that they had been cleared for action and were 
extremely suspicious, for they advanced, but very slowly. Finally, 
they seemed to come to the conclusion that the white ship with awn- 
ings, lying there quietly, without any warlike preparations, could 
have only a peaceful mission. A boat was lowered, the pilot came on 
board, and we ran in. The entrance is similar to that at Santiago de 
Cuba, and quite narrow. There is a bend to the north which makes 
it difficult for large ships to enter the harbor, because the current 
coining from several directions is usually very strong at this place, so 
that a ship turning slowly might easily run aground on the eastern 
point. Here also the indefatigable activity of the Spanish troops 
could be noticed. They were working energetically on new batteries, 
which were armed with field guns. There were mines in the entrance. 
Works of defense, trenches, etc., had been built in the direction of 
the castle. The number of regular troops was conspicuous; there 
appear to have been no volunteers at that place. As we passed, the 
soldiers stopped in their work to take a look at the ship. At one of 
the landing piers, at the narrowest place of the entrance, a crowd of 
people and regular soldiers had gathered. A band on the porch of 
one of the houses was playing "The Watch on the Rhine," a courtesy 
extended to the German ship by the Spanish commander. We 
steamed into the large bay and after passing several small islands 
and shallow places we saw before us the city of Cienfuegos. The 
channel is narrow even here ; the large bay has many shallow places, 
and only a narrow passage leads to the city, at which our ship cast 
anchor some distance from the shore. Nevertheless, the harbor of 
Cienfuegos is one of the best of the whole island of Cuba, and with the 
expenditure of the necessary funds a very fine place could be made 
of it. Outside of Santiago, whose commerce, owing to the inaccessi- 
bility of the country back of it, will probably never be developed to 
any great extent, Cienfuegos is the only good harbor on the southern 
coast, and has therefore probably a great future. It is also to be 
noted that the largest sugar factories of Cuba, which are mostly oper- 
ated by American capital, are in the vicinity of Cienfuegos. 

6. The small Spanish gunboats lying in the harbor were doing guard 
service at the entrance, relieving each other every day. Besides these 
the torpedo-boat cruiser Galicia was in the harbor. An unlucky star 
seems to have been over this vessel. At first it was stated that she 
was to be docked in order to make repairs. Afterwards she was again 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



31 



pronounced seaworthy; but the fact is that she never left the harbor 
during the whole period of the war. There was no lack of provisions 
noticeable in the city. The Spanish Government had bought up the 
provisions and set selling prices on them. For instance, a pound of 
beef was only 80 pfennigs (16 cents) — certainly a Ioav price consider- 
ing that the blockade had already lasted two months. On June 13 
gun fire was heard in the direction of the entrance. The Spanish 
gunboats went out and had a slight engagement with an American 
auxiliary cruiser, probably the Yankee. The gunboat Vasco Nunez 
de Balboa was shot through the bow above the water line, and sev- 
eral of the crew were wounded. In other respects the engagement 
was of no importance. The following day we left Cienfuegos, spoke 
the American cruiser Yankee, which was on blockade service, and 
after stopping a few days at the Isle of Pines we shaped our course 
for Havana. 

7. In the morning of June 22 we came within sight of the table- 
land. We kept close to the shore in order to inspect the harbor of 
Mariel and to see how far the American blockading line extended. It 
was not long before the blockading ships, among them the gunboat 
Wilmington, which was lying close to Mariel, came in sight. There 
was the usual exchange of signals. A heavy thunderstorm was 
threatening. Morro Castle, which had been visible in indistinct out- 
lines, disappeared behind a dark cloud. The storm came up rapidly. 
The flashes of lightning followed each other in quick succession, the 
thunder roared, and the rain was coming down in torrents with a 
force only possible in the Tropics. The blockading ships had van- 
ished from sight. We could hardly see a ship's length in front of us, 
and the torrents of rain continued to fall, merging the lines of the sky 
and the sea. As we had made out Morro Castle before the storm 
commenced, I had the ship steer for it very slowly. Soon it com- 
menced to clear up in the direction of the land, and while the storm 
continued to rage on the sea and the whole line of blockade was 
still enveloped in rain, we entered the harbor with the assistance 
of the pilot. Involuntarily the thought occurred to me, what an 
opportunity that would have been for a blockade runner ; but 
the matter is not as simple as it looks. It is true that at this 
season of the year a heavy thunderstorm, usually about noon or in 
the afternoon, may be counted upon almost daily. Still the 
chances of being thus favored are too slim to make it advisable 
for a ship to attempt to run the blockade in daytime. The only real 
opportunity is at night. The American blockading fleet consisted of 
the gunboat Wilmington, two gunboats of the Annapolis class, one 
or two monitors and about four auxiliary cruisers, the latter partly 
small vessels. The ships were distributed over a line about •'>() miles 
long, surrounding the harbor in an arc at a distance of about L20 to 
110 kilometers. In my opinion it would not have been difficult lor a 



32 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH- AMERICAN WAR. 



fast ship (15 or 16 knots would have been sufficient, since the Amer- 
ican blockading vessels, with the exception of a few small cruisers, 
did not exceed 12 knots) to run the blockade at night. The require- 
ments were that the night should be as dark as possible, the lights 
on board darkened, and the course shaped straight for the entrance 
through the middle of the blockading line. As the beacon light was 
kept burning all the time, there was no difficulty about steering for 
the entrance. The blockade runner would have had to depend en- 
tirety on her speed and maintain her course without regard to hostile 
projectiles. The firing of guns, including rapid-fire guns, with night 
sights is so difficult that hits can hardly be counted on unless the dis- 
tance is very small. To approach the line of blockade by hugging 
the shore I consider hazardous. The vessel could not have remained 
entirely hidden, owing to the close formation of the line. There would 
have been danger, as soon as the alarm signal was given, for the block- 
ade runner to be cut off from Havana by the blockading fleet and 
forced upon the shore. 

8. Since our last visit to Havana, about a month ago, there was 
hardly any change noticeable in the aspect of the town and the con- 
ditions prevailing there. The harbor was empty and deserted. Two 
steamers, however, could be seen, of rather enterprising appearance, 
one of them even with two small rapid-fire guns on board. The Span- 
ish war ships were still at anchor at the same place. There were no 
foreign war ships. Work on the improvement of the fortifications 
was still going on with the same restless activity. The volunteers 
continued their drills. Provisions were expensive, but the prices were 
held down by the Government, so as to prevent excesses on the part 
of the dealers. The poor were being taken care of as far as possible 
by the distribution of food in free kitchens and by entertainments for 
their benefit. The theaters were kept open. On certain days there 
was music in the public places. The Governor- General did all he 
could to keep up the spirit of the inhabitants. The rate of sickness 
and death was said to be hardly higher than usual. The climate at 
this time of the year is especially unfavorable, because the beneficial 
effects of the rainy season are not yet felt. Inside of the fortified 
region the Government had laid down so-called zonas de cultivo, which 
were intended for the raising of vegetables, etc. , and were expected 
to prove of great benefit. One of the chief articles of food consisted 
of pineapples, which in time of peace are exported in incredible num- 
bers, and which could now be bought in quantities for a fabulously 
low price. 

9. In the forenoon of June 24, I noticed some preparations on board 
the Spanish steamers Montevideo and San Domingo, from which I 
inferred that they were about to put to sea. The time was well chosen. 
The moon set about 10 o'clock, and at midnight both steamers, with 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



33 



all lights darkened, passed through the entrance. They were suc- 
cessful in eluding the American ships. I afterwards met the Monte- 
video again at Yera Cruz, with a full cargo, ready to leave the harbor 
at any moment ; but as far as I could ascertain, the steamer, after 
putting to sea, preferred to return and unload her cargo again. The 
San Domingo, upon her return to Cuba, was captured by American 
blockading ships and run ashore near the Isle of Pines. 

10. We remained at Havana until June 29. We then proceeded to 
Kingston and from there to Santiago de Cuba and Cienf uegos, casting 
anchor at the latter place on the evening of July 8. The blockade 
was now quite strict, as we had an opportunity to find out upon 
approaching Santa Cruz. At Trinidad we met the American gunboat 
Helena, and at Cienf uegos the cruiser Detroit, lying close to the har- 
bor. Nevertheless, the auxiliary cruiser Beina Maria Cristina, a large, 
fast steamer, armed with fourteen o-centimeter rapid-fire and several 
revolving guns, had succeeded in entering the harbor of Cienfuegos. 
Her cargo consisted of dried codfish and ham. Part of the steamer's 
guns and ammunition were used to reenforce the fortifications. The 
city itself had not again been harassed by the American ships. Com- 
munication with Havana by rail was kept up, though there were fre- 
quent delays in the arrival of trains, owing to the lack of fuel. There 
did not appear to be any great scarcity of provisions. A proclama- 
tion by Captain- General Blanco, published in the Gaceta de la Habana, 
apprised the city of the catastrophe of Santiago, which was so disas- 
trous to the Spanish. 

The Spanish at Cienfuegos gained an idea that the ships had gone 
down with all their crews. It was not learned at that time that the 
ships had been run ashore and that the Americans had taken many 
prisoners. The heavy blow was borne with comparative equanimity. 
It was the general opinion that the fate of Santiago was also sealed 
and that then peace negotiations would be opened. 

11. On July 10 the crew of the steamer Alfonso XII arrived at 
Cienfuegos and was transferred to the auxiliary cruiser Beina Maria 
Cristina. The Alfonso XII had attempted to run the blockade at 
Havana, keeping close to the shore, but had been compelled by the 
American blockading ships to run ashore at Mariel. The ma j or i t v 
of the crew was rescued. The cargo was destroyed by the Americans, 
who fired upon the steamer and set her on fire. In connection with 
this attempt to run the blockade we seek in vain for an explanation 
as to why the cruisers, torpedo gunboats, and other vessels in Havana 
Harbor did not assist the blockade runner. The time of her arrival 
could have been announced by cable. It then became the duty of 
the Spanish warships to go out in accordance with a prearranged plan 
and try to divert the blockading ships. Such a maneuver would not 
only have raised the moral courage of the garrison, condemned to 

12483 3 



34 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH- AMERICAN TTAR. 



demoralizing inactivity, but would in all probability also have been 
attended with success. 

12. TTe left Cienfuegos on July 12. and after visiting Vera Cruz, 
again returned to Havana on August 1. The blockading fleet 
appeared to have drawn closer together, so that there was one ship to 
every 2 miles. The flag ship 8cm Francisco was also seen this time. 
Few changes were noticeable in the city itself. There was not as yet 
an actual famine, but the poorer classes were evidently much worse 
off than they had been on our former visit, for the number of beggars 
in the streets had increased. Crowds of poor people would come 
alongside the ships in boats to try to get something to eat. It was a 
sad sight to look upon those half-starved women and emaciated little 
children, barely covered with miserable rags, holding out their hands 
imploringly and asking for alms. Everything floating around in the 
water was examined by these miserable people. Xothing escaped 
their eyes. Parings of fruit and other refuse were caught up and 
sucked out. The suffering was terrible, and we were powerless before 
it. All could not be helped, but at least a few. This scene was 
repeated every noon and evening. The crews gave willingly what 
could be spared, and more than that. Ashore, as already stated, the 
poor rjeople were being taken care of as far as possible by free kitch- 
ens. Since the middle of July about 30,000 rations had been distrib- 
uted in these kitchens. The health conditions were remarkably good 
this year. YeHow fever had not yet made its appearance, but there 
was typhoid fever and dysentery. The sentiment of the population, 
as well as of the troops, seemed to incline toward peace, A general 
feeHng of listlessness had settled upon them since the capitulation of 
Santiago. "If the Americans would only attack Havana." the people 
would say, " they would soon find out what the garrison of the capital 
is made of. They would get their heads broken quick enough. But 
Uncle Sam is only beating about the bush. He is not going to swal- 
low the hot morsel and burn his tongue and stomach." Xo wonder 
that the Spanish troops, condemned to inactivity, poorly fed, cut off 
from the whole world, and without any prospect of relief, were anxious 
for the end to come. And so peace was being talked of everywhere, 
and there was a persistent rumor that the French ambassador at 
YTashington had been empowered to conduct peace negotiations. 

13. After a cruise around Cuba, Haiti, and Puerto Rico, upon which 
I had started at the beginning of August, I returned to Havana for 
the fourth time on September 3. How different everything looked! 
The clouds of smoke of the blockading ships were no longer seen on 
the horizon. That circle of brave vessels, greedy for prey, ready 
every moment to pounce upon anything that came within their reach, 
had vanished. Our first glance was for the flag on Morro Castle. 
The red and yellow colors were still waving there, but there seemed 
to be an air of sadness and listlessness about them, as though they 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH- AMERICAN WAR. 35 



were anticipating their fate of having- to make way for another flag 
without having been conquered. The harbor entrance was animated. 
Many sailing vessels were going in and out. In the harbor itself 
German, English, and Norwegian steamers were busily engaged in 
loading and unloading. Alongside the custom-houses there were a 
number of American and Mexican sailing vessels that had brought 
food and wine. All the storerooms were filled with provisions of 
every kind. The city had awakened to new life, business houses 
were once more open, merchants were again at their work, the streets 
were full of people; yet there was an air of depression over the whole 
city. The one thought, what was to become of them now, seemed to 
have cast a spell over everything. The insurgents were lying close 
to the city, and many of the inhabitants of Havana went out to visit 
with friends or to satisfy their curiosity. Will the United States 
succeed in dispelling the specters they have conjured up? Will 
Cuba Libre triumph, or will the island be annexed to the Union? 
These are the questions which are now ever present. 

14. As peace is now at hand, there is no reason why a discussion of 
the fortifications of Havana, which were erected or improved by the 
Spanish with so much skill, should be kept secret any longer. I will 
therefore try to give an approximate idea of the same : 

(a) The harbor entrance had been made inaccessible by several 
rows of mines. Along the entrance many guns had been set up which 
were fired through embrasures from behind thick masonry walls. All 
these guns were muzzle-loaders of old types. Farther inland there 
was a torpedo battery — two ordinary launching tubes, which had been 
temporarily installed on a float without any protection. 

(b) The object of the shore fortifications was partly to defend the 
entrance and partly to prevent landings. During the first few days 
after the breaking out of the war the Spanish had feared a bombard- 
ment of Havana and a landing of American troops at the Vedado, 
and this fear was well founded, as there was only one fortification 
on the Yedado, and that not entirely completed. The Americans 
allowed that opportunity for attacking Havana by surprise to go by 
without taking advantage of it, because they were themselves by no 
means prepared for the war and had neither troops nor transports in 
readiness. By dint of unremitting activity the Spanish were able 
in the course of the war to place the following works in good condi- 
tion, part of them having been newly erected : 

EAST OF THE ENTRANCE. 

Battery No. 1 (permanent): Four 15-centimeter Ordonez guns; on 
the wings, two 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt vapid-fire guns. 

Battery Xo. '2 (permanent): Two 30. 5-centimeter JKrnpp guns; four 
21-centimeter Ordonez howitzers; two 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt 
rapid-fire guns. 



36 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMEEICAX WAR. 



Velaseo "battery (temporary): Three 28-centimeter Krupp guns: 
three 12-centimeter Hontoria naval guns; one 5.7-centimeter Norden- 
felclt rapid-fire gun. 

Between the latter two batteries there were three small temporary 
batteries, the first of which was armed with two 9-centimeter field 
guns and the second and third with three 12-centimeter and 15- 
centimeter guns, respectively. 

WEST OF THE ENTRANCE. 

La Punta (permanent) : Two 15-centimeter Ordonez guns. 

La Reina (permanent, but considerably strengthened and newly 
armed) : Three 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns (from the cruiser 
Alfonso XII); two 25-centimeter muzzle loaders; seven 21-centimeter 
muzzle-loading howitzers. 

Santa Clara (permanent, but considerably strengthened and newly 
armed): Two 30. 5 -centimeter Ordonez guns; three 28-centimeter 
Krupp guns; four 21-centimeter howitzers. On the flank, two 5.7- 
centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns and three 15-centimeter guns. 

Battery No. 3 (permanent) : Four 21-centimeter Ordonez howitzers ; 
two 15-centimeter Ordonez guns; two 24-centimeter Ordonez guns. 

Battery No. 4 (temporary) : Three 16-centimeter Hontoria naval 
guns (from cruiser Alfonso XII); four 15-centimeter Ordonez guns; 
two 5. 7- centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns. 

Besides these, temporary stands had been erected on the west wing 
for field guns. 

(c) The shore fortifications had their bases of support in some of 
the larger forts, like El Principe and Atares forts, forming the inner 
belt around the city. An outer belt had also been established at a 
distance of about 10 kilometers from the city. The fortifications on 
the outer belt consisted of a large number of infantry sites protected 
by artificial obstructions, stakes, wire fences, etc. For each two or 
three of these sites there were more extensive works with gun stands. 
Thus, all the important points had been connected by one long line of 
fortifications. The defense of the coast east of battery Xo. 1 near 
Cochima (Cojimar?) was suprisingly weak. Batteries Xos. 1 and 2 
are trained toward the sea ; only one 4. 7 -centimeter rapid-fire gun 
covers the flank. The fortifications on this part of the coast consist of 
only one gun site with two field guns. It would seem as though a 
landing with a sufficient force of troops, assisted by the fleet, might 
have had a chance of success. Fortunately for the city the fortifica- 
tions were not put to a severe test. Aside from a few shots at the 
beginning of the blockade, about twenty shots were fired at the 
American cruiser San Francisco toward the end of the war, namely, 
on August 12. The ship did not answer the fire. A Spanish pro- 
jectile hit the stern of the American cruiser as she was steaming 
away, but without causing serious damage or loss of human life. 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



37 



15. In order to show in a comprehensive form the steamers which 
during the war ran the blockade of Cuba, I give in the following table 
the names of the steamers and the different harbors they entered, 
together with their respective cargoes : 



Harbor. 



Isame of ship. 



Date. 



Cargo. 



Cienfuegos 
Do.... 



Steamer Montserrat Apr. 26 

Steamer Adula June 17 



Do Steamer Keina Maria Cris- June 22 

tina. 

Santiago de Cuba a. Steamer Polaria May 7 

Caibariena Steamer Alava July 4 

Do Steam er Franklin do 

Manzanillo Steamer Anita 6 June 18 

SagualaG-randea.. Steamer Frit jot Hansen July 3 

Matanzas Steamer Montserrat July 29 



Cayo Frances a Steamer Franklin July 31 

Batabano Coast steamer Arturo 6 June 13 

Do Coast steamer Sara & June 24 



Do. 
Do. 



Bark Tres Hermanos b June 20 

do July 14 



Do Coast steamer Victoria July 13 

Do Steamer Villaverde b June 23 

Do 1 Brig Bujia ' July 26 

Nuevitasa Steamer SafB. May 20 

I 

Do Steamer Franklin June 11 

Do Steamer Cbateau Lafitte June 17 



La Isabella (sea- Steamer Kegulus July 19 

port of Sagua la 
Grande), a 



San Cayetano . . , . . . Steamer Pralrono b Aug. 



War material. 

50 barrels flour, 50 barrels corn, 50 sacks 
rice. 10 tubs butter. 15 barrels pork, 15 
barrels beef, 10 barrels hard tack, 6 
sacks beans, 5 backs pease. 

1,000 boxes bacon, 50 barrels bacon sides, 
600 barrels codfisb. 200 sacks beans. 

300 sacks barley. 14.000 sacks rice. 

2,500 sacks flour, 6 barrels codtish. 

2,495 sacks flour, 3,056 sacks corn, 200 
sacks spices. 333 sacks potatoes. 

Small quantities flour, rice, and meat. 

Small quantities potatoes, onions, meat, 
and rice. 

8,000 sacks rice, 805 sacks beans, 600 sacks 

pease. 500 sacks flour, 1,399 boxes bacon, 

213 boxes codfish, a large quantity of 

smoked meat. 15 barrels'drugs. 
3,495 sacks flour, 1.350 sacks corn, 500 

sacks rice. 165 sacks beaus. 
800 sacks corn, 150 sacks flour. 20 sacks 

pease. 100 sacks beans, 80 cans lard. 
35 boxes flour, 20 half boxes and 2,490 

sacks corn. 
Beans, flour, and corn. 
156 tubs bacon, 200 sacks rice, 160 sacks 

corn, 129 barrels flour. 60 boxes meat, 

65 boxes condensed milk. 
237 sacks corn, 20 sacks pease, 100 sacks 

flour, 200 sacks beans, 5 sacks lentils, 

12 boxes salt meat, 120 cans, 2 barrels, 

and 4 tubs lard. 
4,785 sacks flour, pease, coffee, beans, 

corn, and rice. 
6 barrels lard. 438 sacks rice, 22 sacks 

beans, 200 sacks flour. 
125 sacks pease, 95 sacks rice. 185 barrels 

wine, 650 sacks salt, 50 boxes oil, 5 

boxes cheese, garlic, bard-tack, and 

pepper. 

2,266 boxes flour, 284 sacks rice. 2.593 
sacks beans, 96 sacks spices. 50 sacks 
pease, 697 sacks corn, 72 sacks coffee. 

50 barrels codfish. 6 barrels soup, 3,885 
barrels flour, 9,295 sacks fiour, 5,000 
sacks rice. 

6,573 barrels flour, 1,000 sacks wheat, 
4,000 sacks corn, 450 boxes canned 
meat, 1.000 barrels pork. 500 barrels 
bard-tack, 30 boxes groceries, 1 box 
quinine. 

400 sacks flour. 100 sacks rice, 100 sacks 
beans, 200 sacks corn, 272 tubs lard, 20 
baskets garlic. 10 baskets onions. 



The above demonstrates once more how difficult it is to maintain 
a blockade even nnder the most favorable circumstances, as in this 
case, where the Spanish navy did not make a single attempt to shake 
off the blockading ships. I am nnable to say what part of the pro- 
visions mentioned in the foregoing table went to Havana ; probably 



a These ports were never declared to be blockaded. 

b These ports were not declared to bare been blockaded until after these dates. 

Only four of the above-mentioned ports were included in the President's proclamation declaring 
certain ports to be blockaded, viz, Cienfuegos and Matanzas on and alter April 22. 1898, and Manzan- 
illo and Batabano on and after June 27, 1898. 

Out of the 22 instances given in the table of vessels entering Cuban ports during the war. there 
were but 9 of these which ran the blockade. 

O. N. I. 



38 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



all those that were landed at Batabano, but I have information from 
reliable sources that on August 12 the military administration of 
Havana had provisions on hand for three months longer, outside of 
what the blockade runners had brought into the country and what 
was hidden away in the houses of the city. One can therefore 
understand the indignation of Captain General Blanco when he heard 
that the peace protocol had been signed. But of what use would 
have been a further resistance on the part of the Spanish garrison ? 
The United States Government only needed to make the blockade 
more rigid. That would necessarily have sealed the fate of Havana 
sooner or later. A fortress in the ocean, cut off from its mother 
country, can be rescued only with the assistance of the navy. 
The enemy who has control of the sea need only wait patiently until 
the ripe fruit drops into his lap. 

The lessons to be derived from the foregoing are evident and need 
no further explanation. May our colonies be spared the fate of 
Havana. 



Z 



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
War Notes No. IV. 
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 



SKETCHES 

FROM THE 

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 

BY 

COMMANDER J 

(CONCLUDED.) \' , * . 



TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN. 




OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 



WASHINGTON : 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 

1899. 



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
War Notes No. IV. 
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 



SKETCHES 



FKOM THE 



SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 

BY 

COMMANDER J 

(CONCLUDED.) 



TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN. 




OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 



WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899. 



INTRODUCTORY. 



Sketches from the naval battle of Santiago and occupation of Puerto 
Rico, by Coininauder Jacobsen, of the German protected cruiser Geier, 
given in this number of the War Notes, are a continuation of Sketches 
from the Spanish- American War, by the same officer, given in War 
Notes No. III. 

Richardson Clover, 
Commander, U. S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer. 
Navy Department, March 27, 1899. 



Approved : 

A. S. Crowninshield, Bear- Admiral, U. S. N., 

Chief of Bureau of Navigation. 

3 



SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 



By Commander J 

[Translated from the Marine-Rundschau, January and February, 1899— Concluded.] 
VI. THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 

1. I have no official sources at my disposal from which to give an 
account of the battle. The reports of Admiral Sampson and the com- 
manders of the American ships, as well as the reports on the condition 
of the Spanish vessels after the battle and on the positions and move- 
ments of all ships during the battle were published in the New York 
Herald. From the Spanish side nothing has been published except a 
short report of Admiral Cervera to Captain-General Blanco and an 
article entitled "Admiral Cervera's fleet" published in the Eevista 
General de Marina. Under these circumstances it is inevitable that 
errors and omissions will occur in the account of the battle; but, on the 
whole, it will probably give an approximately correct idea. 

Paragraphs 2-13, inclusive, have not been translated as they were 
from United States publications containing: 

(1) Descriptions of the United States and Spanish vessels engaged 
in the battle. 

(2) Chart showing the positions of the ships during the battle at dif- 
ferent times between 9.30 a. m. and 1.15 p. m. from the records of the 
United States Naval Board appointed to plot such positions. 

(3) Description of the engagement compiled from official reports of 
the commanders of the United States vessels. 

(4) Condition of Spanish vessels after the battle, as shown by the 
United States board appointed to examine them. 

14. With Admiral Sampson's permission the officers of the Gcier 
inspected the Spanish ships on August 12, more than a month after 
the battle, at which time the following observations were made: 

(a) The ships, after coming out of the harbor entrance on a westerly 
course, turned to starboard and ran ashore in small coves, where they 
probably saw the best chance for their crews to reach the shore through 
the surf. 

(b) The reason for beaching the ships can probably be found in the 
fact that the fires which broke out on board after the first American 

5 



6 



hits could not be controlled by the crews, who had lost their heads 
under the hail of hostile projectiles. All three of the ships present 
pictures of the most frightful ruin, chiefly due to the explosions and 
the conflagrations, which did not reach their full intensity until after 
the ships had been run ashore. All the woodwork and combustible 
material had been burned. The following will give an idea of the 
intense heat that must have prevailed : 

The iron deck beams and other horizontal iron parts were very much 
warped; the bearings of the connecting rods had been melted; the iron 
masts had been partly melted where they pass through the upper deck; 
the brass frames of the ports between decks had been partly melted, 
and the ports themselves were found on deck converted into large 
lumps of glass; parts of the rapid-fire mounts had been melted, the lead 
in the small caliber and machine-gun projectiles had melted and run 
out, and the casings had been reduced to ashes. 

(c) Besides the conflagrations and subsequent explosions, the ships 
sustained such severe leaks when running ashore that it will be impos- 
sible to float them again, with the exception of the Maria Teresa, which 
is now being attempted to be hauled off. 1 

All the masts of the ships had fallen aft and had been hurled to the 
deck with their tops. Only the mainmast of the Maria Teresa was 
left standing, which is an evidence that she ran ashore at less speed, 
which is further shown by the fact that she sustained less leaks than 
the other ships. The mainmast of the Oquendo had fallen to star- 
board and broken in two upon striking the railing and one part gone 
overboard. 

(d) Nothing definite could be ascertained as to the boats that had 
been on board. There was nothing left but the wrecks of two iron 
steam launches hanging in the warped and partly broken davits on 
board of each of the ships. 

(e) The engines were probably intact in all of the ships at the time 
they ran ashore, for they were apparently running at great speed — at 
least the Oquendo and the Vizcaya. 

The machinery installation on board the ships was about as follows: 
a. The two main engines and six main boilers are located in five 
water-tight compartments below the protective deck. Above them, 
between decks, and protected by lateral coal bunkers, are two large 
auxiliary boilers of at least 12 tons capacity, and many auxiliary 
engines, conspicuous among which is a large and powerful centrifugal 
bilge pump with a discharge pipe of about 300 mm. diameter. The 
protective deck, extending from the stem to the after torpedo room, is 
slightly vaulted forward of the boiler rooms, and pierced above the 
boiler and engine rooms for the passage of smokestack casings and 
engine skylight, but is protected at this place by a strong glacis, rising 



1 In the meantime the Maria Teresa has been floated by American wreckers, but 
she sank on her way to Norfolk. — Ed. " Rundschau." 



7 



at an angle of about 30 degrees from the inner bunker walls. The 
openings in the engine skylight and smokestack casings were protected 
by iron gratings. The protection by lateral coal bunkers extended 
through boiler and engine rooms, reaching to the battery deck, a 
height of 3.5 meters. Alongside the engine rooms in each of the 
bunkers to port and starboard forward and starboard aft was a room 
for engine supplies, while to port aft was a well- equipped workshop, 
extending nearly to the ship's side. In the workshop was a small 
1-cylinder steam engine for driving transmission gear, actuating a 
turning-lathe, a boring engine, a grindstone, and very strong shears, 
also five vises. The supply rooms appear to have been well equipped, 
but everything seems to have been stored in wooden closets and on 
wooden shelves, for all the tools were found scattered on the floor in 
wild confusion. 

ft. There was a surprising number of rough castings, especially of 
stuffing boxes. Spare parts for the main engines were found suspended 
in the engine skylight; covers, pistons, and slide-valve faces for low- 
pressure cylinders on the bulkheads. To the smokestack casings were 
secured three connecting rods, eccentric rods, etc. 

y. Nothing could be noticed of any provisions having been made for 
the protection of the machinery installations except the iron gratings. 
In the Almirante Oquendo coal sacks were found near the auxiliary 
boiler, but their object could not be determined, the boiler room being 
flooded. The steam pipes above the protective deck do not appear to 
have been disconnected before the battle. Valves leading to auxiliary 
engines, which were not used during the fight (such as ash-hoisting 
machinery, pumps for auxiliary boilers, etc.), were found open. The 
centrifugal bilge pump above mentioned also appeared to have been in 
gear. The bulkhead doors above the protective deck were all open. 
They could not have been opened subsequently, since all the bulkheads 
had been warped by the heat, but the bolts were intact. 

(/) At the time of our inspection nothing could be ascertained 
regarding the injuries in the engine rooms, because they were all under 
water almost up to the protective deck. It was learned from an Ameri- 
can engineer engaged in the wrecking operations of the Infanta Maria 
Teresa that no dead bodies had been found in the engine and boiler 
rooms, and hence it is probable that there have been no material inju- 
ries to the boilers and steam pipes. All the bunker bulkheads and con- 
necting doors are said to have been open and all the fires of the boilers 
lighted. 

(g) The damages above the protective deck had been caused chiefly 
by the conflagrations, but also by hits from the enemy's secondary bat- 
tery. The inadequacy of the lateral protection of the engine rooms 
was striking. The supply rooms and workshops had been hit a num- 
ber of times. Shots which entered the coal did not go through. Only 
one hit was noticed in the auxiliary piping above the protective deck of 



8 



the Infanta Maria Teresa. The shot had gone clear through the pipe 
without ripping it open, from which it may be inferred that there was 
no steam in it at the time. 

(h) On the gun and upper decks the smokestack casings had been 
perforated in several places, also the smokestacks themselves. Appar- 
ently no measures had been taken for closing up these shot holes. The 
electric wiring had been struck in many places. Shot holes were also 
noticeable in the speaking tubes. It was not possible, owing to the 
complete destruction by fire, to make any further investigation of the 
means of communication and command. 

(i) The three ships inspected had all their guns on board. The 
only ones that could not be found were the two 7-centimeter rapid-fire 
boat guns, but pivots had been provided on both sides of the stern, 
where these two guns were apparently intended to be installed for use 
against torpedo boat attacks at night. 

(k) From the slight losses which the American ships claim to have 
sustained, it may be judged that the training of the Spanish gun crews 
must have been very inadequate. This is not surprising, in view of 
the statement of one of the Spanish naval officers to the effect that no 
target practice is held in Spain in time of peace. Other circumstances 
also give evidence of very inefficient handling of the guns. The turrets 
and their guns, with the exception of the forward turret of the Almi- 
rante Oquendo, were found entirely intact. The loading apparatus for 
the 28-centimeter guns (Whitworth, Manchester, 1895) was of the 
hydraulic order, and the loading time was about two minutes. The 
14- centimeter rapid-fire guns also were probably not used to their best 
advantage, owing to want of experience. There was evidently no lack 
of ammunition, for near some of the guns a number of cartridges were 
found, and some of the guns were still loaded, but had not been fired. 
To what circumstance it is due that the breechblocks of two of the 
guns were found lying in the rear of the guns with their pivot bolts 
torn off", could not be explained. Perhaps this may also be attributed 
to inefficient handling of the projectiles. 

(I) Only the port side of the ships was fired upon. The starboard 
side shows but a few holes, where shots have passed out. Where the 
course of projectiles could be traced it was usually ranging from port 
aft to starboard forward. The destructive effect of the American pro- 
jectiles is mainly due to the conflagrations caused by them. Aside 
from a shot through one of the turret roofs, no hits were observed in 
any of the armored turrets. Neither have any projectiles pierced the 
side armor, which shows no injuries. Only iudentations are noticeable 
in places where projectiles have struck the armor. Projectiles of 15 
centimeters and larger calibers that had hit the ship had in many 
instances gone out through the other side, making holes about 1 meter 
square, but without bursting. As the same observation has been made 
in the bombardments of Santiago and San Juan, it may be assumed 



9 



that it is due to the uncertain functioning of the base fuse. It is not 
probable that the Americans used armor-piercing shell, as fragments 
of projectiles of different sizes found in the vicinity show that explosive 
shell and not nonexplosive shell were used. Projectiles which had hit 
smokestacks and masts had gone clear through, making only small, 
round or oblong shot holes. Hits of small-caliber projectiles (5.7-centi- 
meter) could be noticed in large numbers, and this was corroborated by 
the statement of an American officer to the effect that they were used 
in great quantities. 

(m) The question whether the Spanish had any intention of making 
use of the torpedo weapon may probably be answered in the negative. 
The torpedo armaments of the ships, although including a large num- 
ber of tubes, were so defective that there could hardly be any chance 
of success as against the powerful American ships. The armaments 
consisted of two bow, four broadside, and two stern tubes, all above 
water and of antiquated design, with large cartridges, band-brakes, 
etc., all located above the armored deck and entirely unprotected. In 
a very primitive manner the tubes had been partly protected by grate 
bars lashed with chains. 

(n) The projectiles were 35-centimeter Schwartzkopff torpedoes with 
large depth-regulating apparatus. 

No war-heads were to be found, with a single exception. According 
to the statement of an American petty officer, the war-heads had been 
left at Santiago, where they were to be used in connection with the 
mine obstructions. It is true that this does not agree with the fact 
that a torpedo head exploded on board the Almirante Oquendo. It is 
possible, however, that the ships retained one or two war-heads to be 
used in case of necessity as against rams, since the broadside tubes 
were adapted to be turned in any direction, or perhaps it was the com- 
mander's wish to take a war-head along. 

(o) The following points support the assumption that it was not the 
intention to make use of the torpedo weapon : 

a. Not one of the tubes still in existence was loaded, and all the 
tubes were closed. In the tubes destroyed by shots or otherwise no 
remnants of torpedoes were found. 

/?. The remaining torpedoes, almost without exception, were lying in 
their places along the ship's side. No torpedoes were found lying back 
of the tubes, with the exception of the bow tubes of the Almirante 
Oquendo. 

y. There was no pressure in any of the flasks. This is shown by 
the fact that the flasks were entirely uninjured, although the heat had 
partly melted the tailpieces of the torpedoes. 

6. In several of the torpedoes lying on top, the protecting cap for 
the depth-regulating apparatus had not been taken off, while it is 
necessary to remove it in order to put on the war heads. 

e. In a few of the torpedoes the sinking valves had been put in place, 



10 



but in most of them they were still found soldered, with connecting 
links raised. 

C. The tubes for filling the launching cartridges were not connected, 
and only on the Almirante Oquendo was the powder charge in readiness. 

A. INFANTA MARIA TERESA. 

(p) This was the flagship, and the first one to be beached, about 6 
miles from the entrance of Santiago. The ship's bow was lying only a 
little higher than usual above the waters line, the stern a little lower; 
otherwise upright. She evidently ran ashore at slow speed, for aside 
from the fact that there were only small leakages in the bottom, no 
boiler explosion took place, nor was the mainmast thrown down. In 
other respects also her injuries are much less than those of the other 
ships. The ammunition rooms appear to have been previously flooded, 
and therefore did not explode. 

(q) This ship shows very few hits from the hostile guns, especially 
few of small caliber as compared with the others. While all the wood- 
work has been burned, the same as on the other ships, little damage 
has been sustained by the ship's hull. The ship has therefore been 
floated by the Americans. 1 All leaks had been stopped up, the ship 
pumped out, and then hauled off by steam tugs about 6 feet toward 
the sea. In this operation she sprang another leak aft and was again 
filled with water. On the day of our inspection this leak was being 
stopped up and the water pumped out by means of four steam pumps. 
Heavy articles, such as anchors, chains, etc., had been transferred to 
one of the wrecking steamers. While the ship was dry the two forward 
boilers had been set to work, and with them the auxiliary piping and 
several bilge pumps. One of the workmen stated that the engines had 
been found intact. The engine rooms could not be visited, because 
they were under water up to the tops of the cylinders. It could only 
be ascertained that the engine skylight had not been damaged. 

(r) Three hits of large caliber — probably 20-centimeter — were 
observed: 

a. A shell had entered the after torpedo room close above the 
water line, had passed through a heavy stanchion and a lateral bulk- 
head, and out through the starboard side, where it had torn a hole 
about 1 meter square. There were no indications to show that the 
projectile had burst. The shot hole on the starboard side was slightly 
forward of and about 1 meter higher than that on the port side. 

(3. Another projectile had passed through the whole length of the 
compartment above this torpedo room and out through the starboard 
side, likewise without exploding. 

y. A heavy shell must have exploded at the upper conning bridge, 
for the top of the conning tower, without having been perforated, 
showed large oblong scars, caused by heavy explosive fragments. 



1 She sank again on her way to the United States. — Ed. " Rundschau." 



11 



(s) A 15-centimeter shell had struck the port bow and loosened the 
reenforcement ring of the hawse hole. No injuries from explosive 
fragments were noticed here. 

Another 15-centimeter shell had perforated the 3-centimeter shield 
of a 14-centimeter rapid-fire gun on the port side. Fragments had 
destroyed the shaft of the elevating gear and both hand wheels. 
Others had perforated the forward smokestack casing. This hit 
appears to have annihilated the whole crew of this gun, near which 
six charred bodies were found. 

Another 15- centimeter shell had damaged the after smokestack, after 
passing through the empty part of a coal bunker, which was still filled 
with coal to within 1 meter of the ceiling. 

(t) Yery few small- caliber hits were noticed, only 6 in the ship's sides, 
2 in the forward, and 5 in the after smokestack, though one of the lat- 
ter may perhaps have been caused by a 15-centimeter projectile. Near 
the stern three indentations were noticeable in the side armor, proba- 
bly caused by 5.7-centimeter projectiles which, striking at a very small 
angle, had glanced off. 

(u) Further observations made are as follows: 

All the breechblocks of the rapid-fire guns and parts of the raeehan- 
anism of the revolving guns had been thrown overboard by the Span- 
iards. Whether the turret guns had also been rendered unserviceable 
could not be ascertained. In any event, they had not been injured by 
hostile projectiles nor by the conflagrations. The gun sights were also 
missing. Inside the armored turrets no damages of any kind were 
noticeable. Even the paint had hardly suffered from the heat. In 
the after-turret gun a projectile had been rammed home, but appar- 
ently the cartridge had not been entered. The conning tower was not 
injured, only burned on the inside. 

(v) The torpedo launching tubes and torpedoes had been less dam- 
aged by shots and fire than in the other ships. The complete remnants 
of twenty-four torpedoes were found, with the exception of the war 
heads. Only a few practice heads were found. 

B. ALMIKANTE OQT7ENDO. 

(w) This ship sustained very severe leaks when running aground. 
She lies over to port, with the bow about 1 meter light and the stern 
1J meters deep. The ship appeared to have her back broken in the 
region of the foremast. The rapid-fire ammunition room just forward 
of the after turret had exploded. Amidships everything above this 
room had been hurled down. The protective deck was heaved up and 
wrenched from the sides. The deck beams throughout were badly 
warped, and both sides of the ship showed large holes, through which 
the water was washing in. The second explosion had taken place in 
the forward rapid-fire ammunition room. The effects were about the 
same as aft. On one side they were still further increased by the 



12 



explosion of a torpedo war head in the forward broadside torpedo room. 
Here the aperture in the ship's side had reached the dimensions of two 
meters in width and about 5 meters in length, its lower edge being 
formed by the armor. 

(x) The Almirante Oquendo had suffered more than either of the other 
ships from hostile projectiles. 

a A 15 to 20 centimeter shell had torn a piece about 20 centimeters 
wide and 50 centimeters long from the upper edge of the gun port in 
the top of the forward 28-centimeter turret and burst inside. A num- 
ber of small holes, caused by shell fragments, covering a space of about 
1 meter square, were noticeable in the top of the turret. There were 
no other traces of shell fragments. The bore was empty, the breech- 
block closed, and a shell was found in the rear of the gun in position 
for loading. Back of the gun and to the left of it two charred bodies 
were found, and to the right a mass of human remains that had appar- 
ently formed two more bodies. A head was found lying on the plat- 
form under the gun. Where the turret commander had been standing 
another charred body was found lying on its back, with the gun sights 
under it. The gun itself appeared to have sustained no injuries. 

fi. A shell, probably of 20 centimeter caliber, had passed through the 
ship's side in the engine workshop, where it had demolished the trans- 
mission shaft, the boring engine, and the turning lathe; then through 
the engine skylight and exploded on the other side of the latter, in the 
engine supply room. 

y. A heavy projectile had passed through the smokestack and out 
thr ough the starboard side without having bursted in the ship. 

6. About 25 meters from the stern a heavy shell had struck the 
'tween- decks and passed through it. On the starboard side inboard, 
several small holes were visible, apparantly from fragments of this 
shell. 

e. A shell, probably of 15- centimeter caliber, had hit the shield of 
the fourth 14-centimeter rapid-fire gun. The irregular holes noticeable 
in the forward smokestacks are probably attributable to fragments of 
this shell. The wheels of the revolving and elevating gear of this gun 
had also been damaged. 

C. A 15-centimeter shell had passed through the port coal bunker 
and out through the starboard bunker. 

rf. A 14-centimeter rapid fire gun on the starboard side had been hit 
on the left side by a 5.7-centimeter shell ranging forward. The pro- 
jectile with solid point had passed entirely through the forward hoop 
and penetrated the bore to the depth of 2 centimeters. There were no 
splinters from the gun, but the displaced metal had been forced out at 
the edges, which is a proof of its great tenacity. The point of the pro- 
jectile had been broken off and was lying near the gun. The hole is 
about 15 centimeters long and at the widest place 5 centimeters wide. 

3. In the whole port side about forty small- caliber hits were counted, 



13 



most of them amidships. The smokestacks had also been hit several 
times by small projectiles. - 

z. Ottier observations made on board the Almirante Oquendo are as 
follows : 

The armor had not been injured by any hits. In two of the rapid- 
fire guns the sights were found set for ranges of 13 and 14 kilometers, 
and in the 5.7-centimeter after-port gun at 10 kilometers. The sights 
of all the guns, with the exception of the revolving guns, had traveling 
eyepieces. None of the sights were found set for short ranges. Some 
of the 14-centimeter rapid-fire breechblocks were missing, while some 
of the guns were found completely loaded. 

(y) The torpedo tube in which a torpedo had exploded had been torn 
into small fragments, the largest of which were a guiding bar and a 
hinged door. The torpedoes secured to the ship's side had also been 
destroyed, with the exception of the flasks, which had been hurled 
several meters from their positions. The bulkhead 'tween-decks near 
the place of the explosion showed traces of the same. Pieces about 4 
centimeters square had passed entirely through it, while still smaller 
pieces had penetrated it to the depth of several millimeters. The 
conning tower had remained intact. 

In the forward torpedo room torpedoes were found near each of the 
tubes, but without war heads on them. The port tube had the depth- 
regulating ajjparatus in readiness. The outer cap of one of the tubes 
was still open. The tubes had been bent by the grounding of the ship. 
They were not loaded. 

c. VIZCAYA. 

(z) The Vizcaya, like the Almirante Oquendo, is so seriously damaged 
that there is no prospect of hauling her off. This ship also ran ashore 
at great speed, and the keel was apparently broken in two, for with 
each sea the stern would rise and fall with loud creaking and groaning. 
The vessel was lying almost upright with only a small list to port. 
All the rooms below the protective deck, and the after rooms above it, 
were flooded. 

Near the forward turret an explosion had taken place in the lower 
part of the ship, probably in one of the ammunition rooms. The wood 
part of the upper deck had been burned, and the iron plating torn 
open, and through the gap could be seen a chaos of brokon anchor 
gear, capstans, chains, cement, rubbish, torpedo tubes, etc. The hull 
is about equally damaged on both sides. 

a. The protective deck had been ripped open and the plating folded 
back on the starboard side, between the forward smokestack and the 
ship's side, probably as the result of a boiler explosion. The pivot 
sockets of the 14-centimeter rapid-fire guns had been torn away and 
the guns bent back to such an extent that the bores were pointing 
upward almost vertically. 



14 



/3. Hot coal gas and smoke issuing from an open bunker hole showed 
that the coal was still burning. 

y. The Vizcaya has suffered little from hostile fire. A 15 to 20 centi- 
meter shell had struck the forward broadside topedo room, dismounted 
the port tube, and had apparently killed a number of men. Several 
charred bodies were found scattered over the whole room. 

A 20-centimeter shell, ranging forward, had passed through the 
ship's side, through a locker amidships near the second 14-centimeter 
rapid-fire gun, and through a lateral bulkhead abaft of the forward 
turret ; then, striking the turret, had glanced off without causing auy 
impression, and exploded on the starboard side. 

A heavy shell had entered the gun deck forward of the after turret 
and passed out through the starboard side without bursting in the 
ship. 

Besides these three large-caliber hits, about twelve smaller ones 
could be noticed in the broadside, most of tliem of 4.7 and 5.7 centi- 
meter caliber j also five hits in the forward and one in the after 
smokestack. 

Other observations were made as follows: 

The conning tower had not been damaged by projectiles, but com- 
pletely burnt out on the inside. The conning bridge was totally 
demolished. Two charred bodies were found still lying in the tower, 
also several bodies or parts of bodies in different places on the iron 
gun deck. Many rapid-fire cartridges, either whole or in part, were 
found scattered about ; also a quantity of exploded small-arm 
ammunition. 

The breechblocks of two 14-centimeter rapid-fire guns were found 
near the guns. In one of these guns the projectile had been jammed 
near the muzzle. The whole cartridge was found in one of the bores. 
The breech was open. 

6. The torpedoes had not been made ready for use and the tubes 
were not loaded. 

15. If we compare the observations made by the officers of the Geier 
as to the number of hits with the results of the examination made 
immediately after the battle, we obtain the following figures : 



Hits from — 



10-cm. projectile .. 
J2.7-cm. projectile 
20-cm. projectile . . 

gg" 5 |cm. projectile 

Secondary battery 



Maria Teresa 



1 

5 IV 

»} ™{ 

20 XV 



Oqv.endo. 



5 

5 III 
3 IV 



42 XL 



Vizcaya. 



Colon. 



4 III 
11 XVIII 



In the above table the Arabic figures designate the results of the 
United States Board, while the Koman figures represent the observa- 
tions made at the time of our inspection in August last. It will be 



15 



noticed that there is not much discrepancy in the figures. Of course, 
observations made so long after the action can not lay claim to abso- 
lute accuracy, especially as our sojourn on board was necessarily short. 
The traces of many hits have been partly obliterated by the powerful 
action of the surf, especially in the superstructures, of which hardly 
anything is left standing. It may therefore be inferred that the figures 
of the United States Board are more nearly correct than ours ; but even 
they probably fall short of the actual results. 

16. The Brooldyn was hit about twenty times by shells and several 
times by fragments and machine gun projectiles. The cruiser sustained 
no serious injuries of any kind. The Iowa is said to have been hit 
twice in the bow, just above the water line, by 15-centimeter shells and 
seven times by small- caliber projectiles. The Texas and Indiana were 
hit twice by light projectiles without sustaining serious injuries. 

17. In order to be able to realize the complete defeat of the Spanish 
fleet it is necessary to call clearly to mind its situation in Santiago 
Harbor. Oervera had entered the harbor on May 19. As early as May 
27 five hostile cruisers with several gunboats and auxiliary cruisers 
were observed in front of the harbor, and there was no longer any 
doubt that the whole American battle fleet was blockading the harbor. 
Then followed the bombardments of Morro Castle and the Socapa, sev- 
eral shells falling into the bay, and the Spanish ships retreated closer 
to the city. On June 3 the Merrimac was sunk, but the entrance 
remained unobstructed. On June 22 occurred the landing of the 
American troops, who on July 1 attacked the fortifications of the city. 
Five hundred men of the landing corps of the Spanish ships took part 
in the defense and are said to have fought very valiantly. 

18. The Government authorities at Havana were very anxious to 
have the fleet leave the harbor, in order to remove the main object of 
the attack upon Santiago; for the ships had been the cause of the 
blockade and of the attack on the unprepared city. Hence it was 
imperative that the ships should leave. It is probable that ever since 
the middle of June this had been suggested to Admiral Oervera by the 
authorities at Havana; but the Admiral appears to have declared that 
it was impossible to make an attempt to run the blockade at night. 
Whether direct orders were finally given to leave the harbor under all 
circumstances I have not been able to ascertain. 

19. Admiral Oervera was in a very difficult position. He was expected 
to act in some manner. He did not dare make the attempt at night, 
and so he decided to go out with his fleet in broad daylight. The 
whole crew fell a victim to this fatal decision. Instructions for the 
order of the sortie and the taking of the western course had been pre- 
viously issued by the chief of the fleet. According to the Eevista Gen- 
eral de Marina, Vol. XI, No. 3, August, 1898, the Admiral was entirely 
convinced of the impossibility of defeating the enemy or of reaching 
another Cuban harbor, even if he should succeed in steaming right 



16 



through the hostile fleet. It is to this feeling of helplessness and impo- 
tence as against the American naval forces more than to anything else 
that I attribute the defeat. The Spanish ships had spent a month and 
a half in the harbor without even attempting to attack the blockading 
fleet when a favorable opportunity presented itself, or even of harass- 
ing it. The two torpedo boat destroyers were not used for the purpose 
for which they were intended. This inactivity and lack of initiative 
must have had a very demoralizing effect on the officers and men. If 
we add to this the certain knowledge that the opposing forces were 
much stronger, it will be readily understood that the idea of general 
flight after coming out of the harbor entrance was the only acceptable 
one, especially in view of the possibility of beaching the ships, thereby 
rendering them unserviceable, and eventually rescuing the crews. From 
the very moment that this feeling of impotence took possession of the 
Spanish and led to the above reflections their fate, psychologically 
speaking, was sealed. We do not mean to disparage their valor and 
tenacity in the midst of the hostile fire; but, on the other hand, it is 
quite natural that the Admiral, seeing that everything was happening 
as he had foreseen, was the one who set the example of running his 
ship ashore. All the other commanders followed this example. 

20. On the American side the situation was just the reverse. Ad- 
miral Sampson's fleet was fully conscious of its power. The blockade 
was being conducted in accordance with carefully prepared plans, as 
were also the arrangements in case of the enemy's attempt to escape. 
Frequent engagements with the Spanish forts had given commanders 
and crews that calm and assurance in the handling of their weapons 
which guarantees success. The long blockade service, exhausting and 
monotonous, hardly interrupted by any action on the part of the Span- 
ish, had strung the nerves to the highest pitch, and everybody was 
anxious for the end to come. Suddenly the enemy attempts to escape. 
All the passions that had been smoldering under the ashes break forth. 
The welcome opportunity for settling accounts with the enemy had 
come at last, and with a wild rush the American ships fell upon their 
victims. At the beginning the American fire, owing to the excitement 
of the personnel and the great distances, was probably not ver- effect- 
ive; but when the Spanish admiral turned to westward and tire other 
ships followed him the moral superiority of the Americans reasserted 
itself. The commanders, calm and cool-headed, had their ships follow 
the- same course, and the Americans, having every advantage on their 
side, recommenced the fire on the fleeing ships, which soon resulted in 
their total annihilation. 

21. I have already spoken of the lack of training of the Spanish 
crews, the neglect of gun and torpedo target practice, the inadequate 
education of the commanders of the ships and torpedo-boat destroyers. 
It is mainly due to these deficiencies that the defeat was hastened and 
that the American ships sustained so few losses. Furthermore, there 
can be no excuse for having allowed the cruiser Cristobal Colon to 



17 



leave Spain without her heavy armament. It has also been stated that 
the rapid-fire guns of this cruiser were unserviceable, so that she was 
really completely defenseless. The training of the engine personnel 
also was totally unreliable, which is not surprising in view of the fact 
that the Spanish ships, as a rule, are not sent out on extensive cruises. 
The bottoms of the Spanish ships had not been cleaned for a long time, 
and as they had been lying in Santiago Harbor for a month and a half 
they were considerably fouled. Thus the cruisers Maria Teresa, 
Oquendo, and Yizcaya, which in all official books are credited with 18.5 
knots speed, went into the battle with a speed of from 10 to 12 knots 
at most, and the Cristobal Colon, which is the latest ship and was to 
run 20 knots, hardly attained a speed of 13.5. Under these circum- 
stances, in every way unfavorable for the Spanish, whose crews were 
insufficiently trained and physically and morally enervated by long 
inactivity, whose ships were inferior in number, speed, and fighting 
efficiency, it is no wonder that the victory of the Americans was easy 
and paid for with insignificant sacrifices. 

22. There was only one chance for the success of the sortie. It should 
have been made at night in scattered formation. After a personal 
investigation of the locality, it is my opinion that it is entirely practi- 
cable for a fleet to leave Santiago Harbor at night. The wreck of the 
Merrimac did not constitute an obstruction. It is true that Admiral 
Sampson's report on the night blockade states that the light-ships 
were lying from 1 to 2 miles from Morro Castle, according to the state 
of tbe atmosphere, and that they lighted up the channel for half a mile 
inside. Even the best search light, however, does not reach farther than 
1 mile. Therefore the illumination could not have been very effect- 
ive. Moreover, the shore batteries, by opening fire upon the light-ships, 
could have compelled them to change their positions; but, strange to 
say, this was never done. The dark nights at the time of the new moon 
about the middle of June would have been best suited for the enter- 
prise. Besides the four vessels of the fleet, two large Spanish merchant 
vessels lying in Santiago Harbor might have been taken out in order to 
deceive the enemy. The six vessels, with lights darkened, should have 
follower 1 ^ch other out of the harbor entrance, in predetermined order, 
as fast a» possible. They should then have steered different courses, 
previously determined, with orders not to fight except when compelled 
to do so by the immediate vicinity of a hostile ship or when there was 
no possibility of escaping the enemy in the darkness. A rendezvous 
should have been fixed for the next day, where the ships that succeeded 
in escaping were to assemble. 

23. If the fleet did not dare attempt a night sortie and was neverthe- 
less compelled to leave the harbor in obedience to orders, then the 
ships should have been headed straight at the enemy. All weapons, 
including the torpedo and the ram, should have been used. A bold 
attack in close formation was the only chance of success against the 

17176 2 



18 



superior hostile fighting forces, who would hardly have found time to 
form their lines. 

24. I shall not attempt to discuss at length all the lessons which may 
be derived from the battle, because this would lead too far. I will only 
enumerate them, and confine myself to dwelling a little more fully on 
those which are of the greatest importance for practical service. 

(a) Abolition of all woodwork. 

(b) £fo unprotected torpedo tubes. 

(c) Protection for all gun crews against shell fire. 

(d) Protection of the fire-extinguishing apparatus against shell fire. 

(e) Smokeless powder; greatest possible simplicity in the service of 
the guns and greatest possible rapidity of fire. 

(/) Good speed of the ships under normal conditions. 

(g) Thorough training of the crews in all branches of the service. 

25. The last two are the most important. A ship may show very 
brilliant results at the trial trip and be credited with the greatest 
speed in the different books on the navies of all nations; but for the 
officer who is to command the ship in battle this is not a criterion 
from which to judge of her efficiency. Frequent trial trips under full 
steam, making it possible to discover and cure defects of the machin- 
ery in time of peace, and familiarizing the personnel with the function- 
ing of the vessel in all its details, can alone give the commander an 
idea of what he may expect of his ship in battle. Extensive cruises at 
war speed should also be made, in order that the personnel may get an 
idea of how much more will be required in time of war. This is espe- 
cially important in the tropics, where the great heat materially affects the 
physical endurance and efficiency of the boiler and engine personnel. 

26. The most perfect training of the crews in all branches of the 
service, especially by all kinds of torpedo and gun practice, as nearly 
as possible under war conditions, is the foundation of success. As I 
said in Part IV of this work, nothing should be left undone to attain 
the greatest perfection possible in time of peace. .No expense should 
be spared to enable those who bear the responsibility of the battle — 
the chiefs of fleets and squadrons, as well as all commanders — thor- 
oughly to test the actual degree of efficiency of their crews by prac- 
tical exercises, resembling as nearly as possible the operations of 
actual warfare. 

27. Such exercises will also demonstrate whether the weapons, from 
a technical standpoint, are equal to all the exigencies of war. I learned, 
for instance, that the following defects were found to exist in the Amer- 
ican artillery materiel : 

(a) Brooklyn. — In the 5.7-centimeter rapid-fire guns cartridges were 
jammed in several instances. In the 20-centimeter guns the plugs 
stuck several times. Some of the 12.7-centimeter rapid-fire guns 
became unserviceable toward the end of the battle because the elevat- 
ing gear did not function properly, and all these guns had to be sup- 
plied with new mounts after the battle. 



19 



(b) Texas. — The two 30.5 centimeter guns had been fired several times 
across the deck, considerably damaging the latter. A suggestion made 
in time of peace that the guns be tested in that respect had not been 
followed out. 

(c) Iowa— On this ship, also, the deck had been damaged by the 
firing of the heavy guns. The training gear of the 20-centimeter guns 
had not been able to sustain the firing at great elevation. 

The most careful examination of the artillery materiel in time of 
peace is absolutely necessary. Even when the strictest requirements 
are made and fulfilled in testing the guns, it is no guarantee that the 
materiel will not in the course of time show defects on board ship. In 
order that such defects may not remain hidden, to become apparent 
only when the guns are used in actual war, at least part of the target 
practice should be held with full service charges. 

VII. THE OCCUPATION OF PUERTO RICO. 

1. In my first visit to San Juan de Puerto Rico (see Part III of the 
Sketches), I found there, to my great astonishment, a comparatively 
large German colony. I learned that in all the principal towns on the 
island, such as Ponce, Mayaguez, Aguadilla, and Arecibo, Germans 
are likewise settled, and in the possession of large business houses, 
enjoy the esteem of the Spaniards as well as of the Puerto Ricans. 
Under these circumstances it appeared necessary to send thither a war 
ship for the protection of the Germans when the Government of the 
United States commenced action against Puerto Rico. I have success- 
ively visited the harbors of Mayaguez, Ponce, and San Juan. The first 
two were already occupied by the Americans, while the third city was 
still in the hands of the Spaniards. On the 13th of August it became 
known that peace negotiations had commenced, and hostilities ceased. 

No great battles were fought in this campaign ; only a few minor 
skirmishes took place. But the American troops were marched up in 
such a simple and skillful manner that the operations are not without 
interest. Moreover, our readers will be glad to learn some particulars 
about this beautiful island, in which these many years German mer- 
chants, mostly from Hamburg and Bremen, have exerted their best 
energy in steady, unremitting toil, and which now, as the price of vic- 
tory, falls into the lap of the United States. 

2. The accompanying map of the island is the latest and best pub- 
lished. It shows the different departments, so that a description is not 
necessary. All the turnpikes and roads which are to be considered in 
connection with the advance of the American troops, as well as the 
railroad skirting the coast, are also indicated on the map. The moun- 
tain range which extends nearly parallel to the southern coast from 
Adjuntas to Cayey is, on an average, not over 1,000 meters high, and 
from both towns is continued in several spurs to the eastward and 
westward. This range constitutes a weather barrier, as the fresh 
northeast trades cool the northern part of the island and provide 



20 



abundant rains, while in the southern part of the island the mountains 
prevent this moderation, and the heat often becomes unbearable. 
Numerous streams water the fertile soil, which in former years pro- 
duced mainly sugar, but now also coffee, tobacco, and bananas, and 
furnish large areas of magnificent pastures. The number of inhabitants 
in round numbers is 800,000. The area of Puerto Eico is about one- 
tenth that of Cuba, which has hardly 1,500,000 inhabitants. The 
whole island of Puerto Eico is inhabited. There are no extensive uncul- 
tivated stretches, as in Cuba. Still, much remains to be done to obtain 
better yields than heretofore from the rich and fertile soil. In the first 
place, the agricultural methods should be improved, better communica- 
tion established with the coast, and, finally, the mineral treasures of 
the island exploited. In this latter direction hardly anything has been 
done. As far as the social conditions of the island are concerned, it 
has been spared the serious disorders that have been raging in Cuba 
during the last few decades. The Spanish, by means of military posts 
distributed all over the island, and especially the Guardia Civil, an 
excellent police system, have succeeded in maintaining order and 
safety throughout the country. There have been minor disturbances, 
it is true j but at no time has there been an actual rebellion against the 
Spanish Government, such as was spoken of at the beginning of the 
Spanish-American war. Nevertheless, there has gradually developed 
among the Puerto Eicans an intense hatred toward the selfish Spanish 
administration, and with open arms they received the Americans who 
came as liberators from the Spanish yoke. 

3. The general opinion, reinforced by the United States press, was 
that the troops would land east of San Juan, probably at Tajardo. 
General Miles was the only one who was informed as to the landing- 
place selected, and he left Guautanamo on July 21, with the auxiliary 
cruiser Yale and seven transports with about 3,500 men. The battle- 
ship Massachusetts, the cruiser Columbia, and six small gunboats and 
auxiliary cruisers, among them the Dixie, Annapolis, and Gloucester, 
accompanied the transport fleet. Upon reaching Mona Passage the 
fleet headed for the southern coast of Puerto Eico, and on July 25, the 
troops were landed at Guanica without encountering serious resistance. 
The very next day, after a short fight with the Spanish, Yauco, which 
controls the railway to Ponce, was occupied. 

-/■•On July 27, the Dixie, Annapolis, and several other vessels appeared 
in front of Ponce and demanded the surrender of the city. The United 
States general granted time until the next morning, and told the com- 
mander of the city that unless the surrender had taken place by that 
time he should at once proceed to bombard the city, and land his men. 
Cap tain- General Macias, at San Juan, had given the commander strict 
orders to defend the city to the utmost, but the combined efforts of the 
foreign consuls prevailed upon Colonel San Martin to agree to the sur- 
render of tbe city on condition that the Spanish troops would not be 
pursued for forty-eight hours. This agreement, however, of which the 



21 



United States commander had already been notified, was declared null 
and void by Captain-General Macias, who at the same time discharged 
Colonel San Martin from office, and it was only due to the energetic 
efforts of the German and British consuls that the captain-general 
became convinced of the necessity of surrendering, and finally con- 
sented to the evacuation of the city. Thus the Americans took posses- 
sion of Ponce at 6 a. m. on July 28, without loss of life or injury to 
property, and on July 29, they landed a large division of troops, con- 
sisting of from 5,000 to 6,000 men, with artillery and wagons. On 
August 1, two vessels occupied Arroyo, where about 3,000 men were 
landed. 

4. Thus the Americans in a short space of time had gained posses- 
sion of the three principal harbors on the southern coast of Puerto Rico 
without firing a single shot. They owe this first of all to the friendly 
disposition of the population and the lack of energy of the Spanish 
officers, who did not dare offer any resistance. General Miles's sub- 
sequent plan of campaign is self-evident. The troops lauded at Arroyo 
were to advance upon Guayama, thence to Cayey, which lies on the 
main road to San Juan. The fighting forces at Ponce were also to 
advance upon Cayey by way of Juana Diaz, Coamo, and Aibouito. The 
troops at Guanica were to advance by way of Yauco, San German, and 
Hormigueros, and occupy first Mayaguez, then Aguadilla and Arecibo. 
A glance at the map will show that this plan would compel the Spanish 
forces, in order not to be cut off, to retreat to San Juan. When all the 
United States forces had been concentrated at San Juan, they were to 
surround the city, supported by the blockading fleet, and it was here 
that the decisive blow was to fall. 

5. General Miles's plan of campaign was carried out as intended. 
On August 8 General Schwan advanced from Yauco upon San German. 
At Hormigueros they were opposed by the Spanish, who with 1,000 
men occupied an excellent position; but as soon as the American artil- 
lery was lined up and the American lines advanced the Spanish evacu- 
ated the heights and retreated. On August 11 General Schwan took 
possession of the town of Mayaguez, which had been evacuated by the 
Spanish, and met with a hearty reception from the inhabitants. The 
American troops pursued the Spanish and succeeded in surprising them 
on August 12 at Las Marias. The Spanish troops were resting, with- 
out any special measures of precaution, on the bank of the Guasio 
River, when the Americans were discerned on the heights. As the 
river was very high from recent heavy rains, the Spanish had difficulty 
in crossing it. The American commander demanded their surrender: 
but it seems that the Spanish had opened fire, thereby compelling the 
Americans to answer with their artillery. This caused great confusion 
in the Spanish lines. Two companies only succeeded in crossing the 
river, the others had to surrender. The Spanish had 40 killed and 
wounded. Among the many prisoners who were taken to Mayaguez 
were several colonels and captains. 



22 



On August 4 the main body of the troops advanced on the excellent 
road from Juaua Diaz, a small town about 25 kilometers from Ponce. 
On August 9 they took Coanio, which the Spanish were holding with a 
force of about 1,000 men. The fight lasted five hours, and ended in 
the evacuation by the Spanish, as the Americans had succeeded in 
going around the enemy's flank. The Spanish had 15 killed, among 
them the commander in chief and and several officers. About 150 
were taken prisoners. The Americans had 7 wounded. The Spanish 
retreated to Aibonito, where they intrenched themselves in a fortified 
position. They were not effectively attacked here, because hostilities 
were suspended about that time. 

The third division of the American troops had advanced from Arroyo 
and taken Guayama on August 5. On August 8, while advancing 
toward Oayey, the Americans had a slight engagement with the enemy 
intrenched in a fortified position, ending in the retreat of the latter. 
But the American troops had to return to Guayama, because they did 
not consider themselves strong enough to accomplish the task set them — 
viz, to advance as far as Cayey. When, on August 12, the Americans 
started a second time, they found the Spanish in the same fortified 
position. No fight took place, because the news arrived that peace 
negotiations had been entered into. 

6. According to the census of January 1, 1898, the Spanish had the 
following troops in the different departments: 



ARMY. 





Generals. 


Com- 
manders. 


Officers. 


Men. 


Total. 




2 


39 
1 
2 
3 
5 
4 
1 
1 

56 


136 
15 
13 
51 
51 
44 
16 
4 

330 


2, 217 
253 
313 
1.101 
1,317 
997 
320 
96 

6, 614 


2, 394 
269 
328 
1,155 
1,373 
1,045 
337 
101 

7, 002 








Mayaguez 




Ponce 












Vieques 




Total 


2 





NAVY. 





Admirals. 


Com- 
manders. 


Officers. 


Sailors, 
mechanics, 
and fire- 
men. 


Marine 
infantry. 


Total. 


San Juan 


1 


9 


20 
1 
1 


287 
3 
2 
4 
5 
2 
4 
1 


22 


339 
4 
3 
5 
6 
3 
6 
2 


Arecibo 


Aguadilla 












1 
1 




Ponce 








Guayama 




1 
2 
1 




Numacao 








Vieques 








Total 








1 


11 


26 


308 22 


368 





23 



The volunteers have not been included, because, with very few excep 
tions, they laid down their arms as soon as the Americans landed in 
Puerto Kico. 

7. In Puerto Kico, as well as in Cuba, no plans had been made for con- 
centrating the troops at the beginning of the war. The fighting forces 
were so small that landings of the enemy at any point on the coast 
could not be impeded. The troops, by remaining in their different 
departments, might find themselves under the necessity of having to 
fight far superior hostile forces, and finally to retreat within sight of 
the enemy in order not to be cut off. The best plan would have been 
to concentrate all the troops in a fortified position near Gayey, keeping 
up retrograde communication with San Juan. If the enemy had landed 
east or west of San Juan, it would have been easy, in view of the good 
road, to effect a change of front or for the whole force to retreat to 
San Juan, which was the most important point of the Spanish. If 
that city had been defended by 7,000 men, it could have resisted the 
enemy for a long time. It is true, however, that without the prospect 
of assistance from the Kavy, the final surrender of the city, as the 
result either of the harbor being forced by the enemy or of starvation, 
would have been only a question of time. 

8. At the time of our arrival at Mayaguez hostilities had just been 
suspended. General Schwan had taken charge of the administration of 
the department. The inhabitants were entirely satisfied with the new 
order of things, but many families were mourning the fatal defeat of the 
Spanish troops at Las Marias. The prisoners taken by the Americans 
had been quartered in the barracks and were being strictly guarded. 
We had to abandon our attempt to inspect the scene of the battle 
because the road, owing to recent rains, was in very bad condition and 
obstructed by the numerous baggage carts of the American troops. 
But in order to gain at least an idea of the immediate surroundings of 
Mayaguez, I drove to Hormigueros, where the first engagement had 
taken place between American and Spanish troops. A well-kept road 
follows the coast over almost level ground, passing through several 
small hamlets. Soon the scenery changes. Cane fields resplendent in 
their fresh verdure are seen in every direction, and beautiful bills 
closely covered with banana palms and coffee trees appear before our 
eyes and gradually rise higher and higher. 

In the distance the river may be seen, crossed by a number of iron 
bridges, over which the railroad passes that runs along the river. The 
road rises very gradually, and after we had passed over the top of the 
range of hills we saw at our feet the pretty town of Hormigueros. At 
its highest point stands the church from wbich one must gain a mag- 
nificent view over the whole region. We went there, and after mount- 
ing the stone steps into the belfry, we saw before our eyes a panorama 
of indescribable loveliness. Indeed, a better point could hardly be 
found from which to gain an idea of the exquisite beauty of Puerto 



24 



Eico. Far as the eye can see stretch the picturesque ranges of hills 

clad in the loveliest green ; at their feet a few scattered cottages and 
small hamlets, aud glistening streams winding their way through 
them. But we could not allow our eyes to be completely captivated by 
the natural charms of the country. We had also to satisfy our military 
curiosity. One thing became evident at a glance, namely, that the 
church was the best tactical point of the whole region, as all the dif- 
ferent positions could be observed from there. The Spanish commander 
in chief appears to have realized this circumstance; for, as the kindly 
priest of the church told us, it had been his intention to occupy the 
church and line up his artillery on the adjoining hill; but the priest 
had succeeded in dissuading the commander from this plan, which 
would surely have entailed the destruction of the church and town. 
Probably no serious resistance had been planned by the Spanish, and 
they were therefore only occupying the range of hills between which a 
defile leads to the town of Mayaguez, to which the troops retreated as 
soon as the Americans commenced to advance after the first few vol- 
leys. In the little town of Hormigueros peace and quiet were reigning. 
The Americans had already appointed a mayor. A few families from 
Mayaguez had come hither to await farther developments. On my 
return to Mayaguez I had an opportunity of inspecting a company of 
United States volunteers. They were nearly all tall, robust men, most 
of them with healthy complexions and of good military bearing. All 
the volunteers were equipped with Krag-Jorgensen rifles. 
V9. On August 16 we left the harbor of Mayaguez and steamed to 
Ponce, where we arrived in the evening of the same day. The harbor 
was crowded with American war ships, auxiliary cruisers, and trans- 
ports; but as a result of the peace negotiations, many of the war ships 
had received orders to return to Guantanamo or to proceed to the 
United States, so that the harbor was considerably cleared during the 
next few days. General Gilinore, in the absence of General Miles, who 
was then at Coamo, had established the headquarters of his staff at the 
custom-house. The United States garrison was encamped near the 
harbor on both sides of the main road leading to Ponce. The camp 
consisted of ordinary tents, with camp beds raised a few feet above the 
ground. As it always rained several hours daring the day and usually 
all night long, one may easily imagine the condition of this camp. 
Men were constantly at work digging new drains for the water. At 
times the guards and patrols surrounding the camp had to wade in the 
mud up to their knees. It is a wonder that there was not more sick- 
ness in the camp, for the* American general told me there were only a 
few cases of malarial fever. But exposure to the burning rays of the 
sun, to constant rains, and the exhalations of the soil is extremely 
dangerous in this climate, as the residents know only too well, and can 
not fail but have its injurious effects sooner or later. As a matter of 
fact, many cases of fever have subsequently developed among the 



25 



American troops. I can not understand why the military authorities 
had not exercised greater care. Would it not have been better to send 
the troops to Coamo, which is located on much higher ground, leaving 
only a small garrison at Ponce? Such a garrison would have been 
quite sufficient for the protection of the latter town, and might have 
been quartered in public buildings, such as the church, the theater, etc. 
The United States transport steamers are said to have had on board 
all the material necessary for the construction of a small shipyard. If 
it is true that they carried their preparation to that extent, then better 
provisions should also have been made for taking care of human lives. 
If it was not deemed advisable to quarter the men in the towns, then 
corrugated- tin barracks should have been taken along, which can be 
taken apart and speedily erected on piles driven into the ground. 
Ordinary tents were certainly inadequate, y 

10. On one of the following days we made an excursion to the vicinity 
of Coamo, about 30 kilometers from Ponce. The beautiful wide road 
extending all the way to San Juan is a true work of art, and makes it 
possible to advance rapidly. The whole distance from Ponce to San 
Juan, about 135 kilometers, can be made in vehicles, by changing the 
horses twice, in fourteen to sixteen hours. The rise is very gradual. 
On both sides are small huts of natives with corrugated tin roofs, or 
covered simply with palm leaves and built on piles about L meter high. 
Soon we came out upon the open country, where wooded hills and val- 
leys alternated with coffee plantations and banana and sugar-cane 
fields. The profuse tropical vegetation, especially the slender palms 
with their magnificent crowns, is a constant delight to the eye.. After 
the rain, which had been falling all through the preceding night, the 
foliage was particularly green and fresh and the shady road nearly free 
from dust. In several places the road is crossed by the river, which 
can usually be forded. Where it is too rapid bridges have been built. 
Upon reaching Juano Diaz the landscape becomes even more beautiful. 
The heights afford a splendid view of the whole region from the coast 
to the high mountain range. At Ooamo we left the main road and soon 
reached a beautiful valley made famous by the "Bailos de Ooamo. r 
There is a large hotel for the accommodation of visitors. The bathing 
establishment also is very conveniently arranged. A natural spring 

. furnishes sulphur baths. The only thing that reminded us of war dur- 
ing our trip were a few squads of American cavalry and long trains of 
wagons, each drawn by six mules, which were taking the necessary 
supplies to the troops encamped at Aibonito. From what we could 
learn, it seems that the American authorities were preserving excellent 
order and safety at Ponce and vicinity, but the Puerto Rican inhabit- 
ants showed their hatred for the Spanish so openly that in spite of the 
strict measures taken by the Americans there is danger of demonstra- 
tions by the inhabitants in that direction. 

11. On August 23 we made a second visit to San Juan. The mines 



26 



in the entrance had been removed and the channel was marked by 
buoys in the usual manner. Besides the Spanish gunboats Isabel II, 
General Gonche, Greola, and Ponce de Leon, and the torpedo-boat de- 
stroyer Terror, there were neither war nor merchant vessels in the har- 
bor. The city itself presented the same aspect as before the blockade. 
It was not until the latter part of August that steamers arrived and 
commerce and traffic were reestablished. I took advantage of our 
presence there to learn further particulars about the engagement 
between the torpedo-boat destroyer Terror and the United States 
auxiliary cruiser St. Paul. The commander of the Terror gave me the 
following account of the battle: 

At 9 a. m. on June 22 the lookout at the fort signaled a suspicious vessel. The 
commander gave orders for the Isabel II to go out to recotmoiter and for the Terror 
to be ready for action. By 11.30 the vessel had come closer and the Isabel II went 
out. Upon sighting her, the hostile cruiser immediately hoisted her flag and waited. 
The Isabel II opened fire on the foe. The destroyer then received orders to go out 
and assist the Isabel. The Terror, which had heen left hy her fleet at Martinique, 
had not been able to recover her guns and ammunition, which during the voyage 
had been transferred to the Maria Te?*esa inorderto make room lor coal. The Terror 
therefore had no other weapons than her torpedoes and two 57-millimeter guns with 
little ammunition. The Isabel fought the St. Paul at a distance of from 10,000 to 
12,000 meters. As the utmost range of our guns was only 4,000 meters, we could not 
assist the Isabel by going closer to her. I therefore gave orders to head the Terror 
east, so as not to interfere with the Isabel firing north on the enemy. When we were 
sufficiently clear of her and had the open sea before us, I headed straight for the 
St. Paul at a speed of from 20 to 21 knots. 

The enemy, who hitherto had been firing on the Isabel, now directed upon us the 
well-aimed rapid fire of both her batteries, the lower one of which appeared to have 
eight, the upper one ten to twelve guns. At 4,000 meters we opened fire with our 
guns, in order to keep up the spirit of the crew during the long interval between 
the beginning of the hail of projectiles and the launching of the torpedo. Our fire 
was very accurate. At the first shot we saw the shell explode on the stern. Sev- 
eral other shots also hit their target, and our men were wild with joy. We had 
approached to within 1,200 meters and were about to launch the torpedo when the 
Terror commenced to veer to starboard. I had the holm shifted to port, but the 
ship kept on turning. Then I ordered the port engine stopped, and still the ship 
continued to turn to starboard. I then learned that a shell had exploded on deck 
and destroyed the leads to the steering gear and telegraph, so that the vessel fol- 
lowed the movements of the screw and was unmanageable. The hand-steering 
gear was at once put in operation ; but as we passed the enemy at such close range, 
several projectiles hit us, one of them passing through the port side into the engine 
room, where it burst. The engine room became flooded and the engine appeared to 
have been disabled. We just managed to steam into the harbor. 

From an inspection of the Terror it appeared that the fatal shell, 
ranging obliquely downward, had passed through the ship's side, torn 
off a steam gauge, killed three men, and struck the lower edge of the 
main steam pipe, tearing off its covering. This had deflected the shell, 
and it had passed out through the starboard side. It was through the 
hole made by the projectile in passing out that the engine room had 
been flooded up to the lower edge of the steam cylinder; but the 
engines continued to run, so that the Terror, though with gradually 



27 



slackened speed, was able to reach the harbor under her own steam. 
The shortest distance between the Terror and the St. Paul had been 
800 meters. The gunboat Isabel II, I was told by her commander, had 
not gone closer than within 6,000 meters of the enemy. 

12. We then visited the fortification works and made the following 
observations, which may be considered as a supplement to the descrip- 
tion of the bombardments contained in Part III of these Sketches : 

(a) Morro Castle. — On the highest terrace are three 15-centimeter 
Ordonez guns of 30 calibers length and two 21-centimeter breech-load- 
ing howitzers of modern type; direction of fire northwest to west. On 
the next lower terrace are two 15-centimeter Ordonez guns. These are 
all the guns that had been mounted. No guns were dismounted during 
the bombardments. The walls of the fort are over 6 meters thick and 
extremely solid. They show many hits of heavy, medium, and light 
artillery. The heavy projectiles had entered the walls to the depth of 
2 meters and torn large pieces out of the masonry work. The smaller 
projectiles had done very little damage, which had already been repaired. 
One shell had struck the corner of the wall on the lower terrace and 
killed two of the men serving the gnus and wounded several others by 
shell fragments and debris. 

(b) Cristobal Castle. — Two 15-centimeter Ordonez guns of 30 calibers 
length, trained north, fired about eighty rounds during the bombard- 
ment. A little to the rear are three 24-centimeter breech-loading how- 
itzers of modern type. At one of these an enfilading shot passing 
over Morro Castle had struck the breech and killed one man. As a 
result of this accidental hit, and to protect the men serving the farther 
guns against shell fire and debris, earth traverses had been thrown up 
between the guns after the battle. A little further back and to the 
east three 15-centimeter guns, with an arc of fire north by way of east 
to southwest, and hence also adapted to fire on the land, were mounted 
on central-pivot carriages. These took part in the fight with about 
thirty rounds. Finally, at the Princesa Battery, adjoining Cristobal 
Castle on the east, there are four more 15-centimeter guns and two 
21- centimeter howitzers. Cristobal Castle and the Princesa Battery 
sustained only a few hits, slightly damaging the outer walls. 

(c) The howitzer aud gun batteries of the harbor entrance show no 
serious injuries. Morro Castle appears to have been the main object 
of the American fire. The fact that many shells did not explode has 
been much commented upon. 

(d) Besides the fortifications mentioned above, the Spanish had 
erected a new battery at Escambron, with three 24-centimeter how - 
itzers of modern type in central-pivot mounts, for indirect fire. For 
land defense a series of earthworks had been erected near San Antonio 
and armed with mortars and bronze guns. 

13. As we left Morro Castle Spanish soldiers were engaged in tak- 
ing down the shield with the Spanish coat of arms over the main 



28 



entrance. As the remains of the ever- glorious Columbus had been 
removed from the cathedral at Havana, where they had a beautiful 
and well-cared-for resting place, so it was also desired to carry to 
Spain this escutcheon which for centuries had been the witness of the 
victories and greatness of the Spanish nation. When both of these — 
the remains of the man to whom the whole world owes so much and 
the emblem of Spanish power — reach Spain there will be profound sad- 
ness throughout the whole country over the final loss of its colonies. 
The history of this short struggle is another example of the instability 
of power and fame in the ever-changing destinies of the nations of 
the earth ! 

O 



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